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Abstract
Career advancement, political campaign, patent races, marketing, competition for
mates, warfare, and sports competition, are all examples of situations that can be
described as contests. Such contests are ubiquitous in economics, and have thus at-
tracted considerable attention from both theorist and empirical researchers. This
thesis investigates strategic behaviour in games; more specifically it aims at identify-
ing the causal effect of incentives and contest designs on the agents’ behaviours, such
as expenditure of effort and risk taking. To do so, I use quasi experimental situations
arising in different sports as natural experiments. This thesis consist of three essays.
In the first essay I study the existence of the “winner effect” in a multi-stage contest
using a large dataset of ball tracking data from tennis matches, in the second one I
investigate whether professional tennis players serving behavior follows game strate-
gic prediction, and finally I look at how individual incentives and team incentives
influence risk taking in cricket.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a wide range of economic interactions an agent is hired by another to perform some
task. In economics, this types of situation are labeled as “principal agent problem”,
where the principal is the agent commissioning the other to fulfill the task. At the
heart of such situations, there is a major conflict: the agent’s incentives are typically
not aligned with those of the principal. As Arrow (1968) stated: “the agent has been
selected for his specialized knowledge and the principal can never hope to completely
check the agent’s performance.” For instance, a lawyer being paid by the hour has
incentives to work slowly whereas the client best interest might be for a quick resolu-
tion. It is thus critical that principals carefully design their reward schemes in order
to provide the right incentive to their agents and maximize their output. In such
situation, tournaments provide incentives to improve agents’ output.
Tournaments, also referred as contests, correspond to situations in which agents
compete over a price by expanding scarce resources such as effort or money. Since
Lazear and Rosen (1981), they have raised a lot of interest in economics for one
particular reason: they offer a solution to contracts imperfect information.
They are de facto widespread in society and economic organizations such as career
advancement, political campaign, patent races, marketing, competition for mates,
warfare, and sports competition (Konrad 2009). In the following, to shed light on
contest’s pervasiveness, I give examples of major contest applications.
Contests are ubiquitous in firms interactions. For instance, firms compete with
1
each other to expand their market share. To do so, they assign a large part of their
resources to advertising and marketing. In such tournaments resources expended
are substantial; for instance in 2013 Coca-Cola invested over 3.3 billion dollars in
advertising. Promotional competition have been studied by Rosen (1986), O’Flaherty
and Siow (1995), Dubey and Haimanko (2003), and Gershkov and Perry (2009).
Another area where contest is relevant to the firm is research and development, in
which firms compete to be the first to patent a new technology (Harris and Vickers
1985, Harris and Vickers 1987).
Beyond the corporate environment, contests are prevalent within the political
process (Whitford 2005, Klumpp and Polborn 2006). Political parties are spending
resources to win election. And within these parties, members are competing to climb
the hierarchy. In his 2008 presidential campaign Obama disbursed 670.7 million USD,
which illustrates the enormous amount of resources expended within political contests.
Parties involved in legal dispute try to influence court’s decisions in their favor.
Coughan and Plott (1997) and Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) studied the effect of
countries differences in the judicial process on litigation expenses. Contest theory
investigates other questions such as whether one should go to court, negotiate, hire a
lawyer, etc.
Warfare is one of the most obvious and dramatic contest example. In a typical
military conflict, countries compete by producing and allocating resources such as
money or troops. Most military conflicts have been modeled by the “Blotto game”
(Borel 1953) and its variations, in which two players have to simultaneously allocate
troops over different battles. Why does war occurs? (Fearon 1995) Whether one
should go to war or negotiate? These are other key questions investigated by contest
theory.
And finally, perhaps the most obvious application of contest is sports competition.
Sporting events are multi-billion businesses. For instance, the 2014 football World
Cup generated 4.8 USD billion in revenue for FIFA. To maximize revenue and spec-
tators’ interest, sporting competition’s structure are carefully design. For instance,
in tennis tournaments, players’ seeding increases the competition’s attractiveness by
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making sure that the best players reach the later stages of the competition.
In professional sport highly trained and motivated individuals compete for high
stakes rewards under clear rules. Furthermore, sport’s data quality and quantity is
unmatched by most economic datasets. It is thus not surprising that most economic
studies empirically investigating contest theory in the field used sport competition.
Eber (2008) reviews extensively what economists have learned from the analysis of
professional sports.
1.1 Contest: theory and empirical research
Contest theory has a wide range of applications and is supported by numerous stud-
ies. Contingent on the circumstances, contest designer may strive to maximize or
minimize agents’ effort expenditures. For instance, resources spent on political cam-
paigns are usually seen as a social waste, whereas managers seek to enhance their
labor force’s efforts. Tournaments’ designs are crucial to impact agent’s effort expen-
diture. Nonetheless, the effect of tournaments on agents’ behaviour critically depends
on their ability to identify their incentives and react to them accordingly.
Fifteen years ago Prendergast (1999) remarked a lack of empirical evidence on the
effect of incentives on agents’ behaviour in tournaments. Since then, the empirical
research on contests has flourished. As an illustration, Dechenaux, Kovenock, and
Sheremeta (2015) observed that more than 90% of experimental papers investigating
contest theory have been written after 2007.
The empirical investigation of how agents react in tournaments faces the chal-
lenge of disentangling the effect of effort, luck, ability and belief on performance. To
overcome this challenge, economists have used three different experimental methods.
Laboratory experiments which offer a well-controlled but sterile setting, field exper-
iments which are experiments administered in participants’ usual environment, and
natural experiments where researchers exploit situations occurring without special
intervention.
In the following, I will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each methods
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to empirically investigate behaviour in contest.
1.1.1 Laboratory experiments
Effort expenditure is contest theory’s cornerstone (Konrad 2009). Measuring effort
in the field remains arduous, that is why most empirical research has been done
in laboratory settings. Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2015) reviews this
growing literature. Experimental results have provided some support to economic
theory predictions. But it also suggests that many of the biases or non-conventional
preferences found in behavioural economics limit the validity of standard economic
predictions. For instance, experimental subjects expend more effort than theoretically
predicted. Various reasons have been proposed to explain such behaviour, such as non-
monetary utility of winning, wrong belief or bounded rationality (Sheremeta 2013).
While much has been unveiled in laboratory experiments, such experiments have
shortcomings. Indeed, laboratory settings offer the experimenter great control but
the extend to which experimental findings hold in the real world is unclear. The
interactions in the laboratory differ in many ways from the ones in the field. The
laboratory is an artificial environment where subjects perform tasks which they are
unacquainted with.
Investigating contest theory in a laboratory setting has two major limitations.
First, effort’s implementation in the laboratory is artificial. For instance, in a
large number of laboratory experiments effort is chosen, that is subjects are asked
to bid an effort level after being informed about the tournament’s characteristics
such as cost of efforts and their relative strength (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987,
Millner and Pratt 1989). While chosen effort experiments allow to cleanly identify
the investigated effect, this implementation is artificial and the ecological validity of
such results are ambiguous. In an attempt to mimic the real world more closely, some
experiments implement real effort task, in which subjects undertake tasks such as
calculus (Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden 2001) or moving sliders (Gill and
Prowse 2012). While real effort experiments are less artificial than chosen effort ones,
they are still far off from the interactions observed in the field.
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Second, experimental subjects’ deviations from optimal strategies might be due
to lack of experience or talent. To illustrate how economic agents ought to resolve
optimization problems Friedman and Savage (1948), take the example of talented bil-
liard players, playing as if they knew the law of physics. From this example, it easy to
understand how experience and talent may play a role in players’ strategic behaviour.
While it is relatively straightforward to comprehend how to play an experiment, it is
arduous to play well (Walker and Wooders 2001).
1.1.2 Field experiments
Studying economic agents’ strategic behaviour in their natural environment is critical
to complement laboratory findings (Harrison and List 2004). Dechenaux, Kovenock,
and Sheremeta (2015) review the literature exploring contest theory using field ex-
periments.
Erev, Bornstein, and Galili (1993) were the first to investigate contest theory in the
field. They randomly allocated groups of fruit picker under different payment schemes
and demonstrated that tournaments incentives enhance performance by reducing free
riding behaviour.
Numerous studies used field experiment to analyze the effect of incentives on
agents’ behaviour in contests (Fershtman and Gneezy 2011, Leuven, Oosterbeek, Son-
nemans, and Van Der Klaauw 2011, De Paola, Scoppa, and Nisticò 2012, Hong, Hos-
sain, and List 2015, Delfgaauw, Dur, Sol, and Verbeke 2013). The majority of these
studies found support for contest theory predictions. For instance, De Paola, Scoppa,
and Nisticò (2012) found that higher monetary prices increase students grades.
Field experiments allow the researcher to observe subjects’ behaviour in their
natural environment. However, this method has also its pitfalls. Firstly, participants
are generally aware of being under scrutiny which may altered their behaviour. And
secondly, incentives in field experiments are usually lower than in the real world.
5
1.1.3 Natural experiments: Sports as a laboratory
In spite of the substantial advances provided by laboratory and field experiments,
it is essential to observe players strategic behaviour in settings unaffected by an
experimenter.
Sports provides an ideal context to study agents strategic behaviour in naturally
occurring tournaments. First the players are highly motivated, second they have been
playing the game for many years, third they play under clear rule, and fourth a large
set of observations is available. As Szymanski pointed out:
The ready availability of output and productivity data make [...] sports
potentially one of the most fruitful laboratories for research on incentives
and performance. (Szymanski 2001)
Empirical studies using sport data have flourished in the past decade with the emer-
gence of large sport statistics dataset.
Many of these studies have found that well trained agents in competitive tourna-
ments do follow standard predictions with agents reacting to the incentives in tourna-
ments (Taylor and Trogdon 2002, Palacios-Huerta 2003, Brown 2011) and adopting
strategic behaviour closer from standard economic predictions than what is typi-
cally found in laboratory studies (Walker and Wooders 2001, Chiappori, Levitt, and
Groseclose 2002, Hsu, Huang, and Tang 2007, Klaassen and Magnus 2009, Malueg
and Yates 2010, Abramitzky, Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill 2012). For instance, in sharp
contrast to laboratory findings Walker and Wooders (2001) demonstrated that pro-
fessional tennis players serving behaviour closely follows game theoretic predictions.
This finding offers precious insight into the role of experience and talents on the abil-
ity to approximate optimal solutions. In Chapter 3 we reaffirm this result employing
a dataset 100 time bigger than in previous studies.
Other results also revealed limitations whereby players do not react to the tourna-
ment incentives as theoretically predicted. Romer (2006) argues that due to agency
problems, professional football teams fail to optimize when choosing between kicking
and trying a first down. In a following study Bhaskar (2009), presents further evi-
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dence of agency problems. He found that in cricket, winning a coin toss which allows
to choose whether to bat or field first, reduces the chance to win the match.
Psychological limitations have been put forward to explain agents failure to play
at the optimum. Exploiting as a quasi experimental setting the penalty kicks in
soccer, Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) show that professional soccer players
choke under pressure. However, reexamining this results Kocher, Lenz, and Sutter
(2012) do not find such effects. In a related study Paserman (2010) analyzes gender
differences in the reaction to competitive pressure.
Exploiting natural experiments in sports offers great advantages to study strategic
behaviour in contest. Yet it has its drawbacks. In the laboratory the researcher is
observing inexperienced subjects performing under low stakes. In contrast, in profes-
sional sport we study experience subjects from the extreme right tail of skill playing
for substantial stakes. Most contests occurring in the real world involve agents less
talented and experienced than professional sport players. Therefore, similarly to ex-
perimental results the external validity of findings in sports tournaments is uncertain.
1.2 Aim and Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of three essays which aim at improving our understanding about
how individuals behave in contests, as well as providing evidence on whether individ-
uals react optimally to incentives and are able to approximate the optimal strategies.
The complexity of contests with the strategic uncertainty which characterize them
provide an interesting setting to study how close can agents’ behaviour and strategies
be from optimal strategies derived from game theoretic models. More specifically I
aim at identifying the causal effect of incentives and contest designs on the agent’s
behaviours, such as expenditure of effort and risk taking. To do so, I will cleanly
investigate aspects of players’ strategic behaviour by scrutinizing carefully selected
situations arising in professional sports.
In Chapter 2 I present the essay Does success breed success? A quasi-experiment
on strategic momentum in dynamic contests which is co-authored with Lionel Page.
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This chapter contributes to the empirical research on behaviour in dynamic con-
tests. Game theoretical models suggest that players’ performance in dynamic con-
tests should be influenced by their previous performance and their relative position
in the contest. Such models typically predict a winner effect or “momentum effect”:
a sequence of previous good performance can have a positive effect on the future per-
formance of a contestant. The empirical study of such an effect faces the difficulty of
disentangling causal effects of past performance from spurious correlation over time
of performance levels due to unobservable variables. Using a large data set of point
by point ball tracking data from tennis matches over the period 2005-2009, we exploit
the randomized variation in point results that occurs when balls bounce very close
from the court’s line to estimate the causal effect of winning a point of the chance to
win the next point. We find evidence of a substantial momentum effect. Players have
7.2 percent greater chances to win the next point after winning a point than after
losing it. This effect goes up to 10.6 percents point at the most decisive points of the
game
Chapter 3 corresponds to the essayWimbledon Revisited which is co-authored with
Lionel Page and John Wooders. In this paper we investigate the predictive accuracy of
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which is at the cornerstone of modern game theory.
In sharp contrast to prior results based on data obtained from laboratory experiments,
Walker and Wooders (2001) found that the serve and return behaviour of professional
tennis players in championship matches is largely consistent with the predictions of
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This finding has received additional support from
subsequent studies of both serves in tennis (Hsu, Huang, and Tang 2007) and penalty
kicks in soccer (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose 2002, Palacios-Huerta 2003). We
re-examine the findings of Walker and Wooders employing data set comprising over
300,000 serves from 3,172 tennis matches, which is approximately 100 times larger
than in previous studies. The large number of matches in our dataset necessitates
the development of a novel statistical test to examine the joint null hypothesis that
each player in our sample equates the winning probability of serves left and serves
right. We show that this test is more powerful than the one introduced in Walker and
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Wooders (2001). Nonetheless, our findings even more strongly support the original
conclusion of Walker and Wooders that the serve and return behaviour of profes-
sionals conforms remarkably closely to mixed-strategy equilibrium play, except that
professionals switch their direction of serve too often to be consistent with random-
ness. We find that the play of women conforms less closely to equilibrium than that
of men.
And finally Chapter 4 present the essay "‘I take care of my own"’: A Field study
on how leadership handles conflict between individual and collective incentives which
is co-authored with Lionel Page and published in the American Economic Review
P&P. In this paper we explore how individual specific incentives affect both indi-
viduals and team leaders strategies in a natural setting. We use a discontinuity in
individual rewards in batsmen scoring in cricket to identify the causal effect of such
incentives on behaviour. We find that batsmen react to the presence of individual-
specific incentives by adopting strategies that may be suboptimal at the team level.
More surprisingly, we also find that team captains react to these individual incentives
by adopting suboptimal strategies at the team level, which may bring large benefits
to the individual players. These results suggest a complex interplay of individual and
team incentives which we conjecture may arise in repeated team interactions.
These three chapters bring evidence that, the behaviour of experts in the field
with high stakes follow closely standard economic predictions.
While all chapters have in common to use quasi experiment arising in real contests
with large stakes to empirically investigate players’ strategic behaviour, they are
looking at different aspects of contest theory. Thus, they are self-contained and the
relevant literature is independently presented within each chapter.
In the following, I will present the three essays (Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and 4) and
then conclude.
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Chapter 2
Does success breed success? A
quasi-experiment on strategic
momentum in dynamic contests
Romain Gauriot and Lionel Page
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Abstract
Tournaments create incentives which motivate economic agents. Yet the effect of
tournaments on agents’ behaviour critically depends on agents ability to identify
their incentives and react to them accordingly. We investigate how agents react to
changes in incentives during dynamic contests. We use a quasi-experimental situa-
tion occurring in real dynamic contests with large stakes. Using point by point ball
tracking data in tennis matches, we isolate situations where balls bounce very close
to the court’s lines, landing either in or out. We use the associated random variations
in winning probability to estimate the causal effect of being ahead or behind in the
dynamic contest. In line with predictions from contest theory, we find evidence of a
momentum effect for male players. We do not find any significant effect for female
players, suggesting gender differences in reaction to incentives in contests.
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2.1 Introduction
Today, for many economists, economics is to a large extent a matter
of incentives. Laffont and Martimort. The theory of incentives, 2002.
Understanding how agents react to incentives and finding good institutional de-
signs that provide the right incentives are key research questions in economics. For
this reason, tournaments have been the object of an extensive literature since Lazear
and Rosen (1981). Whenever the effort level of agents is not fully observable, tourna-
ments provide incentives to improve agents’ effort levels. They are de facto pervasive
in society and economic organisations such as promotion tournaments, patent races,
rent seeking, litigation, and political contests (see Konrad (2009) for a review of the
literature).
Fifteen years ago, Prendergast (1999) observed a lack of empirical evidence on the
effect of incentives on agents’ behaviour in tournaments. Since then, the empirical
research on contests has flourished. A growing literature in laboratory experiments
(for a survey of the large literature see: Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015)
has provided some support to economic theory predictions. But it also suggests that
many of the biases or non-conventional preferences found in behavioural economics
limit the validity of standard economic predictions. Additionally, a substantial liter-
ature has used field data, in particular from sporting tournaments, to test economic
theories. Many of these studies have found that well trained agents in competitive
tournaments do follow standard predictions with agents reacting to the incentives
in tournaments (Taylor and Trogdon 2002, Palacios-Huerta 2003, Brown 2011) and
adopting strategic behaviour closer from economic predictions that what is typically
found in laboratory studies (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose 2002, Walker and
Wooders 2001, Hsu, Huang, and Tang 2007, Klaassen and Magnus 2009, Malueg and
Yates 2010, Abramitzky, Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill 2012). However other results
also indicate limitations whereby players do not react to the tournament incentives
as would be expected due to non standard preferences (Romer 2006, Berger and
Pope 2011, Pope and Schweitzer 2011) or psychological limitations (Paserman 2010,
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Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta 2010, Genakos and Pagliero 2012).
The question whether agents do react optimally to incentives in tournaments is
especially pertinent when contests take place over time and are dynamic in nature.
In dynamic contests, the agents’ strategies have to take into account past and future
actions of their opponents. Most real life tournaments take place over time and are
de facto dynamic contests (Konrad 2009). The introduction of a time dimension
makes optimal strategies typically more computationally demanding than one period
contests (Klumpp and Polborn 2006, Konrad 2009). As a consequence, dynamic
contests provide a tough test of the validity of standard economic predictions in
regard to strategic behaviour. And it is a test which is worth doing; studying agents
strategic behaviour in dynamic contests is relevant to understand how contests and
tournaments work in practice as incentive schemes.
However, studying players’ behaviour and strategies in dynamic contests faces a
difficult challenge: past performances are typically correlated with unobserved char-
acteristics which influence future performances. This creates a potential endogeneity
bias which may explain the mixed evidence in the existing literature about whether
agents’ strategic behaviour reacts to incentives in dynamic contests as would be
predicted by theory (Ferrall and Smith 1999, Tong and Leung 2002, Malueg and
Yates 2010, Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015).
We address this difficult identification problem using a quasi-experimental setting.
We use a large data set on precise ball location during tennis matches between pro-
fessional tennis players. We exploit the fact that the probability for a player to win
a point varies discontinuously as a function of the location of the ball on the court.
The rules of tennis imply that balls landing just out of the court lines lead to a loss of
the point for the player who hit the ball. On the contrary, play continues if the ball
landed just on the inside of the court lines, giving the player a positive probability
to win the point. We use this discontinuity in the probability to win the point for
balls landing very close to court lines to implement a fuzzy regression dicontinuity
design (Imbens and Lemieux 2008) in order to investigate how professional players’
performance in tennis games changes after winning or losing a point. To do so, we
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extract a very small subset of points where the ball bounced within a few centimeters
of the court lines. In this setting we can investigate how agents adapt their behaviour
in a dynamic contest when their overall advantage relative to their opponent changes
for reasons which are not correlated with differences in players characteristics.
Tennis games are dynamic contests where points are sub-contests. Models of dy-
namic contests typically predict a “momentum effect” for the winner of a sub-contest
(also called “discouragement effect” for the losing player Konrad (2009)). We show
in this paper that this prediction extends to tennis games, such that players win-
ning points should theoretically increase their effort level in later points while losing
players should decrease theirs effort level, leading to a momentum effect. Noticeably,
this prediction goes against the dominant view regularly expressed by professional
players that every point should be considered in isolation with the player making the
maximum effort to win each of them. For instance, Novak Djokovic, ranked number
one player in the world at the time, declared in 2013 after winning a match at the
US Open “I was wishing [...] to be able to stay committed to play every point, to win
every point, regardless of what’s the score.”1
In contrast with this idea and in line with predictions from contest theory, we find
a significant momentum effect for male players: players are 5 to 10 percentage points
more likely to win the next point after winning a given point. We use the richness of
our dataset to test further predictions such that the momentum effect should be larger
when the scoreline is symmetric and towards the end of a game. We find that these
predictions are indeed observed for professional male players. Looking at a smaller
dataset for females we do not find evidence of a momentum effect. This result adds to
a substantial body of research that has established the existence of gender differences
in competition (see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) for a review). It suggests that
part of these differences may arise from differences in how males and females react to
1It is a principle which can also be found as “strategy” advice given by coaches: “Focus on that
skill to the extent that you are not thinking about the score or who is winning”, “Play every point
and return every shot” (Bryant 2011, p. 73 and p. 90). Beyond tennis, it is common to hear this
advice in other sports which are dynamic contests. The professional Canadian ice hockey player
Guy Lafleur declared “Play every game as if it is your last one.”. The company Nike re-used this
advice in a global advertising campaing at the start of the 2014 football world cup, inviting to “Play
every game like it’s ’The Last Game’ ”.
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incentives in dynamic contests.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 places the contribution of
this paper in the existing literature, Section 2.3 presents our conceptual framework,
Section 2.4 presents our identification strategy and our dataset, Section 2.5 presents
the results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
While a wide range of designs exist for dynamic contests, existing models typically
suggest that if agents react appropriately to incentives during a dynamic contest, a
“strategic momentum” should appear. The perfect equilibria of races modelled by
Harris and Vickers (1985) and Harris and Vickers (1987) lead to the leader of the
race making greater effort than the follower. It is also a result found by Ferrall and
Smith (1999), Konrad and Kovenock (2009), Malueg and Yates (2010) and Page and
Coates (2013) in the case of best-of-n contests and by Breitmoser, Tan, and Zizzo
(2010) in the context of R&D races. On the other hand it has also been suggested
that contestants follow a “hare-tortoise” heuristic where the “trailing contestant will
exert more effort to catch up, whereas the leading contestant will slack off” (Tong and
Leung 2002). Outside economics, the notion of “psychological momentum” has been
proposed as reflecting that winning may help enhance contestants’ confidence with
the consequence that “success breeds success” (Dorsey-Palmateer and Smith 2004,
Vallerand, Colavecchio, and Pelletier 1988).
The existing empirical literature presents conflicting results. A large body of re-
search in social psychology initiated by Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) has
argued that momentum does not exist in competitions, and that the layman percep-
tion of momentum (so called “hot hand” in their initial study on basketball players) is
a cognitive illusion. This research has led to a substantial number of social psychol-
ogy studies which have provided mixed empirical results with a tendency to suggest
an absence of any momentum (Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab 2006). However, many of
these studies use statistical tests with low power (Wardrop 1999).
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On the contrary, studies in economics have aimed to test the results from game
theoretical models suggesting the existence of momentum. Within the recent growth
in laboratory experiments on contests, several studies have looked at this question
in a controlled environment (Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015). The evi-
dence here is also mixed: Tong and Leung (2002) and Fu, Ke, and Tan (2015) found
support for a negative momentum effect such that trailing contestants expend more
effort to catch up with leading contestants. On the contrary, Mago, Sheremeta, and
Yates (2013) found experimental evidence consistent with the existence of a strategic
momentum. The equilibrium strategies in dynamic contests are arguably complex
and part of the mixed evidence may come from the unfamiliarity of participants with
such strategic settings.
Looking at real contests in the field eliminates this concern. Several studies have
looked at team competitions in sport contests. Ferrall and Smith (1999) estimated
the parameters of a structural model of strategic behaviour in a best-of-7 contest
using data from US championship series. They found an absence of momentum
in these contests. Teams seem to play each game as well as they can. In an old
study also using data from US Championship series, Simon (1971) actually found
a negative momentum effect, labelled as a “back to the wall” effect. Using a large
dataset on professional basketball matches, Berger and Pope (2011) found that teams
just behind at half time are more likely to win the match, suggesting here again a
negative momentum effect.2
Ferrall and Smith (1999) pointed out that an individual competition like tennis
may however provide more leverage to study strategic incentives than team com-
petitions. The characteristics of tennis have indeed made this sport a workhorse
setting to study players’ behaviour in a strategic game in the field. It has been used
to study whether players can play mixed Nash equilibrium strategies (Walker and
Wooders 2001, Hsu, Huang, and Tang 2007), whether they optimise their chances of
winning when making risk-return trade-offs (Klaassen and Magnus 2009, Abramitzky,
2In the context of political races, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) found some evidence of “momen-
tum” in the US primaries and stress that the importance given to the first primary in New-Hampshire
could stem from the existence of such a momentum.
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Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill 2012) and whether there are gender differences in perfor-
mance in contests (Paserman 2010).
Previous studies have utilised tennis data to investigate the changes of players’
strategies in a dynamic contest. Looking at point by point data from the Wimbledon
tennis tournament, Klaassen and Magnus (2001) found the hypothesis that points
are iid should be marginally rejected in tennis, with the possibility of a momentum
effect in some cases between points. Malueg and Yates (2010) selected a sample of
268 tennis matches where players have identical betting odds, and found support of a
momentum effect between sets of tennis matches. A player winning a first set by two
games or less tends to win the second set more often than his opponent, even though
arguably they are very close in ability. Page and Coates (2013) adopted a similar
strategy, looking at matches where the first set ended up in a close tie-break. They
found the player winning the first set is significantly more likely to win the second
set.
The present study adds to this literature by looking at a quasi-experimental set-
ting within a large sample of tennis games. Our strategy addresses a key difficulty
when trying to estimate the effect of previous performance on later performance in
the field. Past and future performances are naturally correlated due to unobservable
characteristics which impact both of them. Even within a given dynamic contest,
characteristics such as the fitness and ability of the players may not be constant
over time (due to fatigue, injury, learning, or change in team composition for team
contests). This hypothesis of constant underlying ability/skills of the contestants typ-
ically underlies field studies. The mixed evidence from existing studies using field data
may partly come from the difficulty to eliminate the possibility that this hypothesis
may not be fulfilled. Our identification strategy eliminates such a confounding factor
in order to cleanly identify the causal effect of previous results on later performance
(see Section 2.4).
18
2.3 Conceptual framework
Tennis is a dynamic contest composed of several sub-contest levels: players contest
“points” to win “games”, which are needed to win “sets”. Here, we study the existence
of a momentum between points within a game. A tennis game has a structure which is
very similar to best-of-n multiple battle contests. It imposes an additional constraint
whereby the winner needs to have won two more battles (“points”) than the other
player. Figure 2-1 shows the structure of a tennis game.3 Starting from a state
(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) in the game where 𝑠𝐴 and and 𝑠𝐵 are the scores of player A and B respectively,
players move to state (𝑠𝐴+1, 𝑠𝐵) if A wins the point and to (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵+1) if B wins. This
contest structure is studied in detail by Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011) in the
case where players’ strategies are costless. When players’ strategies involve choosing
a costly investment (e.g. effort) as assumed in the literature on dynamic contests, a
tennis game is a hybrid design between a best-of-n contest (which has a maximum of 𝑛
sub-contests) and a “tug-of-war” (Konrad 2009) at the end of the game where players
can move (potentially endlessly) back and forth between the states (3,2), (2,2), (2,3).
Given such a contest structure, we first define the notion of momentum, formalising
the concepts of “momentum” and “discouragement effect” which have been discussed
in the literature on dynamic contests.
Definition 2.3.1. Let (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) be the state of the game with 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 being the
score of A and B respectively, and 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 being the players’ probabilities to win
the point.
(i) There is a momentum effect after state (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) if 𝜇𝑠𝐴,𝑠𝐵 = 𝑝𝐴(𝑠𝐴 + 1, 𝑠𝐵) −
𝑝𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 + 1) > 0.
(ii) A momentum effect is said to be larger after state (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) than after state
(𝑠′𝐴, 𝑠
′
𝐵) iff 𝜇𝑠𝐴,𝑠𝐵 > 𝜇𝑠′𝐴,𝑠′𝐵 .
3Note that the state (2,2) contains both the (30,30) scores and the (40,40) scores or “deuce” as
they are strategically equivalent. For such scores, players need to win two consecutive points to win
the game.
19
A wins
(4, 0)
A wins
(4, 1)
A wins
(4, 2)
(3, 0) //
OO
(3, 1) //
OO
(3, 2)
OO



OO
(2, 0) //
OO
(2, 1) //
OO
(2, 2)
,,
JJ
(2, 3)ll //
B wins
(2, 4)
(1, 0) //
OO
(1, 1) //
OO
(1, 2) //
OO
(1, 3) //
OO
B wins
(1, 4)
(0, 0) //
OO
(0, 1) //
OO
(0, 2) //
OO
(0, 3) //
OO
B wins
(0, 4)
Figure 2-1: A tennis game between two players A and B. A player wins if he/she wins
at least 4 points and two points more than the other player.
Note that we define the momentum with the winning probabilities of player A,
but they can symmetrically be defined with the winning probabilities of player B
since 𝑝𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 1−𝑝𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). Building on the results from Konrad and Kovenock
(2005) and Konrad and Kovenock (2009), we show their finding of a momentum effect
in “tug of war” and “best-of-n” contests generalises to this type of hybrid multi-battle
contest.
Let’s consider two players, A and B, engaged in such a dynamic contest. We model
each individual sub-contest (henceforth “point”) as an all-pay auction.4 Let 𝑍𝐴 and
𝑍𝐵 be the prizes of winning the whole contest (henceforth “game”) for players A and B
respectively. We follow Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and allow the best-of-n contest
4As pointed out by Konrad and Kovenock (2009), “the all-pay auction captures the notion that
random external factors do not play a role in determining the outcome of the contest. The outcomes
are random due to the endogenous uncertainty generated by the use of nondegenerate mixed strate-
gies in equilibrium.” This absence of a lottery component in the contest makes it possible to derive
closed form solutions for values and distributions at every state as well as transition probabilities
between states of multi-battle contest. A full characterisation of equilibrium in multibattle contests
with a lottery element in each state is still an open question and typically requires numerical meth-
ods to derive complete solutions for strategies and payoffs beyond the simplest cases. The case with
no lottery element is therefore a particularly relevant benchmark case (see Konrad and Kovenock
(2009) for an extended discussion on this point). Note that the introduction of a lottery element
does not lead to qualitatively different results in regard to momentum when it has been studied (see
Malueg and Yates (2010) in the specific case of best-of-three contests).
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part of the game to have intermediary prizes ∆, 𝑍𝐵 > ∆ ≥ 0. In the context of a
tennis game this allows for the possibility that players have a preference for winning
points (Sheremeta 2010).
Given the presence of a tug-of-war element at the end, the game has a potentially
infinite horizon. We assume that players maximise the expected discounted sum of
per-period payoffs with 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1 being a common discount factor. Each player
expends his effort in each state 𝑗, respectively 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑏𝑗. In case of equal effort, we
follow Konrad and Kovenock (2005) and adopt a tie-breaking rule advantaging the
player with the largest incentives. We can then establish the existence of a momentum
in such a dynamic contest:
Proposition 2.3.2. If 𝑍𝐴 = 𝑍𝐵, there is a momentum effect in a tennis game with
the following characteristics:
(i) There is a momentum effect after all the states in which the scoreline is equal
or differs only by one point.
(ii) For a discounting factor that is not too small (𝛿 > 1/2), the momentum effect
is larger after states with symmetric scorelines: ((0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2)) than after
states with asymmetric scorelines.
(iii) For states with symmetric scorelines, the momentum effect is larger towards the
end of the game: 𝜇2,2 > 𝜇1,1 > 𝜇0,0.
Proposition 2.3.2. (proof in the Appendix) not only says there should be a strategic
momentum in a tennis game between players with similar incentives, it also indicates
that the momentum should not be identical after every state. Specifically, it should
be stronger after symmetric states and it should be larger at the end of the game,
such as in the state (2,2), than at the start, such as in the state (0,0). These are
testable predictions which are useful to assess whether a momentum exists, and if
so, whether it presents these patterns, which suggest momentum comes from players’
equilibrium strategies.
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While players may have similar incentives at the start of the match, each game
will have a different value for each player depending on the scoreline in a match. It
is therefore meaningful to consider how the result of Proposition 2.3.2 extends to the
case of asymmetric incentives.5 Let 𝑧𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and 𝑧𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) be the prizes to win
the point (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) for players A and B respectively.
Proposition 2.3.3. If 𝑍𝐴 > 𝑍𝐵:
(i) There is a momentum effect after all the states where 𝑧𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) > ∆ and
𝑧𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) > ∆
(ii) For 𝑍𝐵 close enough from 𝑍𝐴, these states are (0,0), (0,1), (1,1), (1,2) and
(2,2).
Proposition 2.3.3. (proof in the Appendix) shows that a momentum also exists in
games where players have asymmetric incentives. In such games, (i) states that there
is a momentum effect after every point where both players have prizes higher than just
the intermediary prize ∆. Such points are tipping points which are heavily contested.
The player winning these points benefits from an asymmetry in incentives in his/her
favour while the losing player faces a disadvantageous asymmetry in incentives. For
𝑍𝐵 not too far from 𝑍𝐴 (ii) states that these points are those where the scoreline
is symmetric or those where the players with the strongest incentives trail by one
point. For low values of 𝑍𝐵 relative to 𝑍𝐴, symmetric scorelines stop being tipping
points and the existence of a momentum effect is concentrated after states where A
is trailing.
The variations in incentives across scorelines also suggest that some points are
likely to be more fiercely contested than others; in some both players will expend a
lot of effort to win, while others will be less contested. Specifically, we can make the
following prediction about the sum of effort expended by the players as a function of
their relative positions:
5Another reason to look at asymmetric incentives is the possibility for players to have different
costs of effort (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵). In the all-pay auction framework, different effort costs can be represented by
different contest prizes by using normalised prizes: 𝑍 ′𝐴 = 𝑍𝐴/𝑐𝐴 and 𝑍
′
𝐵 = 𝑍𝐵/𝑐𝐵 . One situation
where differences in effort costs is likely to arise in tennis is the service game where it is easier for
servers to win points than for receivers.
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Proposition 2.3.4. (Sum of effort)
(i) If 𝑍𝐴 = 𝑍𝐵, the sum of effort is highest for symmetric scorelines.
(ii) If 𝑍𝐴 > 𝑍𝐵, the sum of effort is highest on tipping points where 𝑧𝐴 > ∆ and
𝑧𝐵 > ∆, whenever these sub-contest prizes are close enough.
Proposition 2.3.4. (proof in the Appendix) is intuitive, the sum of effort is highest
on points where the asymmetry in the sub-contest prizes is the lowest. When 𝑍𝐴 =
𝑍𝐵, the sub-contest prizes are equal for symmetric scoreline and that is where the
effort is maximum. When 𝑍𝐴 > 𝑍𝐵 the effort will be greater on tipping points where
both players play for the grand contest, as long as the asymmetry in incentives is not
too large in these states. For 𝑍𝐴 and 𝑍𝐵 close enough these states are (0,0), (0,1),
(1,1), (1,2), (2,2). So that is where we can expect the sum of effort to be the largest
and the points to be the most contested.
2.4 Identification strategy and Data
2.4.1 Identification strategy
A fundamental difficulty in the identification of a momentum is that a given state in
a dynamic contest is reached as a consequence of the opposition of contestants whose
characteristics are never fully observed. Any unobserved difference in ability will
not only influence future performance, it will also have influenced past performance
and therefore lead to different positions in the contest. This creates an endogeneity
problem when trying to regress performance on relative positions in order to estimate
a momentum effect in contests. Typically, the observation that a contestant leading
in a competition has a higher level of performance than a trailing contestant does not
prove the existence of a momentum as the leading contestant is most likely to have a
higher level of ability.
If the contestants’ abilities were fixed over time, the endogeneity problem could
be addressed using a fixed effect estimator to control for the contestants’ unobserved
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characteristics. However, in most cases the hypothesis of time invariant ability is
unrealistic. It is not just the case over large time spans (days/months), but also
within a given competition taking place in a short amount of time (few hours). In the
example of a tennis match, a player may get worse if he gets a minor injury (strain,
blisters) or gets tired from the physical effort (muscle soreness, cramping), he/she
may get better if he/she learns how to use the weaknesses of his opponent. Assuming
wrongly that the contestants’ ability is fixed will bias the estimated effect of previous
performance on current performance. For example, if a contestant’s ability is affected
by random shocks over time and follows a moving average, assuming a fixed ability will
induce a positive serial auto-correlation in the errors relative to the average ability.
This, in turn, will create an illusion of “momentum”, with above average performance
more likely to be followed by above average performance.
We propose here a new empirical strategy which solves the identification problem
in the estimation of a momentum effect. To identify the effect of agents’ position in
a dynamic contest on their current performance, one would ideally have an exper-
imental setting where agents are randomly allocated to different possible states in
the contest. To approximate this ideal in the field, we look for a quasi-experimental
situation. In sport matches, scorelines often evolve differently around some threshold
of performance. We use this to look at situations where contestants with very similar
performance end up in a different relative position to each other (ahead vs. behind).
Analysing point by point tennis data, we exploit a discontinuity in the probability of
winning a point depending on the ball location on the court. When the ball is in,
the player who hits the ball has a positive probability of winning the point. When
the ball is out, the rules state that the player loses the point. Under the identifica-
tion assumption that, for balls hit close enough to the line, there is no difference in
average ability between players putting the ball slightly in and those putting the ball
slightly out, the in/out position of the ball provides an exogenous variation in the
probability to win the current point. We can use this variation to estimate the causal
effect of winning the current point on winning the next point, using a fuzzy regres-
sion discontinuity design (FRD) (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001, Imbens and
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Lemieux 2008).
Formally, to study the causal effect of a binary variable 𝑦1 on variable 𝑦2, the sharp
RD design approach exploits a discontinuity in the values of the variable 𝑦1 around
a threshold 𝑐 of a forcing variable 𝑑 to study the causal effect of 𝑦1 on 𝑦2. The fuzzy
RD design extends this approach to situations where there is a discontinuity in the
expectation 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑑) around 𝑐. In our setting, the forcing variable 𝑑 of the regression
discontinuity is the relative distance of the ball bounce from the court’s lines. The
value of 𝑑 is positive if the ball is inside the court and negative if the ball lands
outside the court. Our goal is to estimate the causal effect of winning the present
point (binary variable 𝑦1) on the chance to win the next point (binary variable 𝑦2).
Around the threshold 𝑑 = 0, tennis rules imply a jump in the probability to win the
current point for the player who hit the ball. This jump can be used to estimate the
effect of winning the present point on the probability to win the next point, using the
Wald estimator:
𝜏𝐹𝑅𝐷 =
lim𝑑↓0 𝐸(Δ𝑦2|𝑑)−lim𝑑↑0 𝐸(Δ𝑦2|𝑑)
lim𝑑↓0 𝐸(Δ𝑦1|𝑑)−lim𝑑↑0 𝐸(Δ𝑦1|𝑑) =
𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2
𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦1
(2.1)
As the effect of the ball being in and out is not fully deterministic, but instead
produces a change in the probability to win the point, the fuzzy regression design
estimator rescales the exogenous variation in the probability to win the next point to
provide the full causal effect of winning one point.
2.4.2 Data
Our dataset corresponds to the official Hawk Eye data, for all the matches played
at the international professional level where this technology was used between March
2005 and March 2009. Hawk-Eye is a computer system used in tennis and other
sports to record the trajectory of the ball. Most of the matches are either from
Grand Slam and ATP (Association of Tennis Professionals) tournaments or lower
level ITF (International Tennis Federation) tournaments: Challengers, Futures and
Satellite. In addition, some matches are from diverse cups like the Davis Cup or the
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Olympic games. Overall the dataset contains 3, 163 different single matches.
For each point we know the position of every bounce recorded by the Hawk-Eye,
as well as which player is serving, the current score, and the winner of the point. The
Hawk-Eye estimates very precisely the location of ball bounces with a mean prediction
error of 0.36 cm.6 In total, we are observing the location of 1, 515, 077 ball bounces
(332, 330 points) for male players and 774, 760 (164, 487 points) for female players.
While bounce data is automatically recorded by the tracking system, the scores,
the identity of the players and the name of the server in each game are manually
entered. This leads to some discrepancies due to data entry errors. We excluded
every game where we observed some discrepancy in at least one point (32.27% of the
ball bounces).7 We also excluded serves in our analysis. Serves are highly rehearsed
shots where players have a high degree of control on the ball’s position and speed
which may allow good players to place the balls close to the lines (20.23% of the
bounces are serves). Furthermore, we include neither game points, as their outcome
can lead to the end of the game (28.82% of the bounces), nor points from tie-breaks,
where the scoring rule differs (2.8% of the data). We otherwise include all points,
including points where players “challenged” the ruling of the line judge about the
position of the ball. In such cases, the challenge of the player may lead to the point
being replayed. As the challenge is motivated by the visual perception from the player
about the location of the ball’s bounce mark, as well as by their strategic incentives
in the match (Abramitzky, Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill 2012), excluding them could
lead to a selection bias around the court lines.8
Table 2.4.2 presents a description of the type of matches included in the dataset.
6As advertised by the Hawk-Eye Innovations website: http://www.hawkeyeinnovations.co.
uk/page/sports-officiating/tennis.
7Similarly to Abramitzky, Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill (2012)’s study on players’ challenge calls,
we are not concerned by a potential selection issue due to these errors in the recording of the tennis
points’ data. They find the reasons for lost observations unlikely to be systematically related with the
players’ strategic incentives in the point. Like them, we computed our estimations on less restrictive
samples when possible and never found noticeable differences.
8Challenge points can lead to the point being awarded to one player or to be replayed if the
umpire’s initial call is overturned. We actually do not observe in the dataset which points are
challenged. We included all the replayed points to ensure that we do not exclude challenged points
(0.8% of the data).
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Gender
Event Features Female Male All
Surface
Carpet 35 174 209
Clay 125 367 492
Grass 96 204 300
Hard 913 1,249 2,162
Best of 3 1,169 1,400 2,5695 - 594 594
Event9
Davis Cup (Fed Cup) 8 18 26
Grand Slam 453 525 978
Olympics 19 16 35
ATP (Premier) 659 100 759
International - 473 473
Master - 826 826
Hopman Cup 30 36 66
Total 1,169 1,994 3,163
Table 2.1: Break-down of the matches included in the dataset.
Matches from both genders and from a wide range of competitions are included.
As the Hawk-Eye system is usually restricted to the main tournaments, the dataset
contains a large proportion of matches from top tournaments (i.e. Grand Slams).
Within tournaments, matches are more likely to feature top players as the system is
used on the main courts and is often absent from minor courts. This aspect implies
that the matches contained in the dataset are more likely to feature the best male and
female players over that period. Any strategic effect to be found is therefore unlikely
to be due to a lack of experience from the players.
For each bounce, the dataset records the location of a bounce mark which is an
oval shape made of 51 different dots. We use this bounce mark to compute the exact
distance between the ball impact and the court’s lines.10 We then use this distance
as a running variable in a regression discontinuity as the probability to win the point
changes markedly around the line; within tennis rules the player hitting the ball has
a positive probability to win the point if the ball is just in but has null probability to
10A detailed explanation about how this distance is computed is included in the Supplementary
Material.
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win the point if the ball is just out.
Figure 2-2 shows the selected bounces for our preferred window of 4 cm around
the court’s line.11 It represents a tennis court with each bounce mark in our dataset
represented by its dot which is closest to the court lines. It is this dot which is relevant
to measure its relative distance 𝑑 to the court lines. Figure 2-2 shows graphically that
only a very small subset of observations is used in the estimation. After cleaning the
dataset we have 780, 548 (406, 885) bounces for male (female), and we only use 4, 939
(2, 744) of them in the estimation, that is 0.67% (0.63%) of the total number.
Figure 2-2: Tennis court lines with the bounce marks present in our overall dataset
(light grey) and those used for our regression discontinuity design (black) for male
players.
For a large sub-sample of the matches where this information was available we
collected the ATP ranking of the players as well as the odds given by the bookmakers
prior to the match. We were able to get this information for 94% of male players’
matches and 68% of the female players’ matches.12 In this sub-sample there are 263
male players and 181 female players. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of players’
ranking across matches.
11We explain this choice in Section: 2.5.1.
12We used the freely available data from http://www.tennis-data.co.uk/alldata.php and used
the odds from the bookmaker http://www.bet365.com.au/en/ which are available in the dataset.
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Gender
Ranking Female Male All
Top 10 vs Top 10 97 173 270
Top 10 vs Non-Top 10 432 949 1,381
Non-Top 10 vs Non-Top 10 283 794 1,077
Total 798 1,882 2,680
Table 2.2: Distribution of players’ ranking across matches, only for the sub-sample
for which the players’ ranking is available.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Momentum: main effect
Figure 2-3 shows the probability of winning the current point depending on how far
the ball bounces away from the court’s line. When the ball bounces inside the court,
the probability of winning the point is positive, whilst when the ball is outside the
court the probability is close to zero. Note that the probability of winning the point is
not zero when the ball is just out of the court. This is due to the fact that line judges
make mistakes and rule “in” some balls which are just “out” of the court but close to
the line. Symmetrically, some balls which are just “in” are sometimes ruled “out” by
line judges and this leads to a drop in probability to win the point. Such mistakes are
well documented and stem from perceptual errors coming with the challenging task
of judging the landing position of a small and fast moving ball (Whitney, Wurnitsch,
Hontiveros, and Louie 2008).13 For balls right on the line there is a high probability
of mistakes each way.
As a consequence, Figure 2-3 does not show a marked discontinuity in zero. Um-
pires’ mistakes may have a detrimental effect for our analysis: it blunts the discon-
tinuity in zero which weakens the power of the fuzzy regression discontinuity esti-
mation. To address this issue we implement a donut regression design whereby the
observations in a small neighborhood of the threshold are excluded (Barreca, Lindo,
13Note that when the ball gets close to the line the probability of winning the point tends to
increase due to the fact that the ball is harder to play back than when it is further away in the
court. However, for balls very close to the line there is a drop induced by umpires’ mistakes.
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Figure 2-3: Probability of winning a point as a function of the distance (in meters)
from which the ball hits the court’s line for male players. Estimation by local linear
regression. In order to capture the possible non linearities of the regression function
around the threshold we use a triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 0.5 cm .
and Waddell 2015, Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and Waddell 2011, Lindo, Siminski, and
Yerokhin 2014, Hansen 2015). This allows us to keep observations very close to the
line while not including the balls right on the line. Balls right on the line carry too
many umpire’s mistakes about the ball position. Their exact position relative to the
line (ie in/out) is therefore a weak predictor of the player probability of winning the
current point. We chose a donut size of 1 cm for the results presented in the main
body of the paper.14 We also use as a non-parametric estimator of the regression
function a kernel regression with rectangle kernels.15
To ensure that our identification assumption is respected, we focus on the points
where the ball fell very close to the line. Our prefered definition of “very close” which
we use in the text to comment on results is a window of 4 cm or less from the court’s
line. To give an order of comparison, tennis balls are designed with a diameter of
14All the results for donut sizes of 0 cm and 0.5 cm are included in the Supplementary Material.
15This specification presents the interest to estimate 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦1 and 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 as local averages from
point located very close from the line, rather than to extrapolate their values in zero where 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦1
tends toward zero. When the derivative of the regression function is not zero, kernel regression
estimators have a boundary bias for too large a bandwidth around the threshold. Given our large
number of observations, we are able to use bandwidths which are very small around the threshold
which mitigates this concern. Furthermore, in our case, the conditional expectation to win the next
point is flat around the threshold. Our estimation of the raw effect 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 of placing the ball just
in rather than just out are therefore unbiased. Given the non linearity of the regression function
depicted in Figure 2-3, a boundary bias may affect our estimation of 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦1 such that our estimate
of the effect of a full point 𝜏𝐹𝑅𝐷 may be slightly dampened towards 0. As a consequence our results
about the effect of a full point are actually conservative.
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approximately 6.7 cm. When they hit the court at high speed they make an oval
shaped bounce mark. The biggest distance between antipodal points on such oval
bounce marks is on average 9 cm in our dataset. As a comparison, the court’s lines
are 5 cm wide. A distance of 4 cm is therefore roughly equal to half the size of the
mark made by the bounce of the ball on the court and it is smaller than the width of
the court line. The choice of 4 cm has two additional motivations. First, it is a small
bandwidth, which ensures that the identification assumption is valid (see section 4.2
for our tests of validity our identification assumption). Second, when considering all
the balls landing within 30 cm from the line, it is the MSE-optimal bandwidth using
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)’s approach.
In any case, given that regression discontinuity estimates are often sensitive to
bandwidth choices, we follow the recommendation from Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) to present results with different bandwidths. Our results are in graphical form
presenting point estimates and confidence intervals for a wide range of bandwidths
for the distance to the line: from 2 cm to 6 cm.
Figure 2-4 shows the discontinuity 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 around the threshold 0. This estimator
does not reflect the effect of winning a whole point. Rather, it reflects the effect of the
jump in probability to win a point which is observed in Figure 2-3 around the court’s
lines. The difference is significant and equal to 4.16% (p=0.013, N=3,588) for males.
It is not significant for female players with an estimate of 0.76% (p=0.739, N=1,953).
The lower panels present the point estimate of 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 for different bandwidths. Our
estimates are significant at 5% for a wide range of bandwidths. This suggests that
putting a ball just “in” rather than just “out” has a positive effect on the probability
of winning the next point for male players. The existence of a significant difference is
important here. As it indicates there is a relationship between an exogenous variation
in the probability to win a point and the chance to win the next point as predicted
by the momentum effect. The existence of a significant effect 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 is therefore the
primary indication that there is a momentum effect.
The fuzzy regression discontinuity estimator (2.1) rescales the difference 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2
to estimate the full effect of winning one point on the chances of winning the next
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Figure 2-4: Raw effect of the ball position on the probability to win the next point for
male players (left) and female players (right) with the 5% level confidence interval.
The top panels present the winning probability around the threshold estimated by
kernel regression with a rectangle kernel of bandwidth 4 cm and a donut of 1 cm.
The jump in zero is the estimation of the effect 𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷,𝑦2 . The bottom panels present
the values of this effect estimated for bandwidths ranging from 2 cm to 6 cm. The
point on the curve represents the estimate of the jump visible in the upper panel.
point, 𝜏𝐹𝑅𝐷. Looking at male players, this effect is equal to 7.21 percentage points
(p=0.012, N=3,588) for balls landing within 4 cm from the court lines. A male player
who wins a point is more likely to win later points and this effect is not trivial. Our
data therefore points to a clear evidence of a momentum effect for male players.
Figure 2-5 presents the results for bandwidths between 2 cm and 6 cm. The point
estimate is most of the time significant and located between 5 and 10 percentage
points. Conversely, looking at female players, there is no bandwidth for which the
effect is significant.16 In the light of the literature on gender differences in behaviour
16While the point estimates are very close from zero, they present more variations than males’
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in competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011), our result suggests that
men and women may react differently to incentives in a dynamic contest.17
Figure 2-5: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the next with the
5% level confidence interval for different bandwidths using a local Wald estimator for
male players (left) and female players (right).
2.5.2 Robustness checks
Our identification assumption is that players who put the ball very close to the line
are of similar ability on average whether the ball landed just in or just out. A
possible confounding explanation of the existence of a momentum effect for male
players would be that the players putting the ball slightly in have a higher ability than
players putting the ball slightly out. To test whether our identification assumption is
respected we run a series of robustness checks.
First, we test for the existence of a discontinuity in the density of the running
variable (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). A discontinuity in the density of the balls’
distance to the court lines would naturally arise if good players were able to precisely
aim on the inside of the court lines. We use the test proposed by McCrary (2008) to
control for such a possibility. This test consists of running a local linear regression in
the values of a thinly binned histogram on each side of the threshold and to estimate
estimates when changing the size of the donut (see Supplementary Material for different donut
choices). However, in no specification, do we find effects close in magnitude to the one for male
player (nor are they significant).
17Results for other donuts size are included in the Supplementary Material.
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the discontinuity at the threshold. Figure 2-6 shows an absence of manipulation of
the running variable. In this figure the bandwidth is set to 4 cm and the binwidth
is chosen optimally by the algorithm (𝑏 = 0.0017). The point estimate is 0.053
(𝑝 = 0.33, 𝑁 = 6, 536).18 In practice it means that good male players are not able to
put their ball inside significantly more often than outside when they hit a ball close
to the line.
Figure 2-6: McCrary test of a break in the density of the ball bounces around the
threshold for a bandwidth of 4 cm for male players.
Second, following the recommendation from Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we test
for the existence of discontinuities in other covariates which could have an influence
on the result. We use the information we have for a large sub-sample of observations
on players’ professional rankings (Association of Tennis Professionals rankings) and
about their ex-ante winning odds for the match. Using these variables, it is possible
to test whether players putting the ball very close to the line but inside the court
tend to have on average better ranking and better betting odds than those putting
the ball just outside.
Following Klaassen and Magnus (2001) we do not directly use the ATP ranking.
The quality difference between two top ranked players (e.g. ranked 1 and 2) is more
pronounced than between two lower ranked players (e.g. ranked 100 and 101). Hence,
we use a smoother measure of ranking proposed by Klaassen and Magnus (2001) by
18In this tests we did not include a donut. Furthermore, in the previous estimations we excluded
the game-points as the server and receiver are switching at the end of the game. This game-points
are included in this test.
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transforming the ATP ranking of each player into a variable 𝑅 as follows:
𝑅 = 8− 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐴𝑇𝑃 ).
The betting odds give the equivalent winning probabilities 𝑝 estimated ex-ante by the
betting market. Numerous studies have found they are very good predictors of the
winning probability (Williams 2009).
Figure 2-7: Differences in measure of ranking (left) and ex-ante probability of winning
the match (right) between male players putting a ball just inside or just outside the
court when considering windows between 2 cm and 6 cm around the court’s lines.
Figure 2-7 shows the estimate of the difference in ranking measure 𝑅 and ex-ante
winning probability 𝑝 around the threshold 𝑑 = 0 for a wide range of bandwidths. The
point estimate for a bandwidth of 4 cm is 0.52 (𝑝 = 0.921, 𝑁 = 6, 188) for differences
in rankings and 0.23% (𝑝 = 0.74, 𝑁 = 6, 139) for the ex-ante probability to win the
match. The absence of discontinuity between the ability of players who hit balls that
are in when close to the line, and those who hit the ball out when close to the line,
further supports our identification hypothesis.
However, the most convincing robustness test is our third test. If players putting
the ball just inside the court were better than those putting the ball just outside,
then we should observe differences in results not only in later points but also in
previous points. On the contrary, the momentum effect can occur only for future
points. We can therefore run a placebo regression, where hitting the ball in or out
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is used as a predictor of the previous point. Figure 2-8 displays the results for the
different bandwidths.19 For a bandwidth of 4 cm the point estimate is with 0.75%
(p=0.629, N=4,147) very small which clearly shows that our assumption holds for
such a bandwidth. For a bandwidth of 4 cm, the point estimate of the placebo
regression is almost zero. Overall, these results suggest that balls landing close to the
Figure 2-8: Placebo test of the effect of winning a point on the probability of winning
the previous one with its 5% level confidence interval for different bandwidths using
a kernel regression and a rectangle kernel (left) and a local Wald estimator (right) for
male players.
line offer an ideal quasi-experimental setting as they provide variations in winning
probabilities which are not correlated with players’ abilities.20
2.5.3 Secondary results
Momentum as a function of the relative position of players in the contest
Propositions 2.3.2. and 2.3.3. predict that the strategic momentum should be higher
for symmetric scorelines whenever there is not too large of an asymmetry in incentives
between players. Table 2.3 shows the effect of winning a point on the next one
depending on the scoreline. As predicted, the momentum effect changes with the score
19Since the server and receiver are switching at the end of each game the game-points were not
included in the previous estimations. Similarly the first point of the games are not taken into account
in this computations.
20Robustness checks for female players and other donut’s size are included in the Supplementary
Material.
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for male players. The effect is much stronger when the scoreline is symmetric at (1,1)
and (2,2). When comparing all the symmetric scorelines vs asymmetric scorelines,
there is a significant difference for male players: the momentum effect is 10.57%
(p=0.011, N=1,747) for symmetric scorelines and only 3.83% (p=0.338, N=1,841) for
non-symmetric scorelines. Moreover, as predicted by Proposition 2.3.2., the effect is
highest for points at the end of the game. The momentum effect is 14.09% (p=0.044,
N=561) for scorelines of (2,2) and 20.41% (p=0.017, N=394) for scorelines of (1,1)
versus only 2.46% (p=0.706, N=792) for scorelines of (0,0).
No such patterns can be found for females. The momentum effect is not significant
for any scoreline, and the point estimate is actually smaller for symmetric (-0.25%,
p=0.96, N=1,010) than for asymmetric scorelines (3.18%, p=0.564, N=943). Fur-
thermore, there is no indication of a higher level of momentum for later points in the
game, with the momentum in (2,2) being almost zero (2.2%, p=0.786, N=395).21
These results by scoreline support the suggestion that male players react to the
changes of incentives during a dynamic contest in a way consistent with contest theory.
The momentum effect is observed for states where the contest is most balanced and is
higher towards the end of the game. On the contrary, we do not observe such patterns
for female players. This adds to the initial absence of a significant overall momentum
effect for female players and it may point to gender differences in how players react to
incentives in dynamic contests.22 Proposition 2.3.3. predicts that when players have
different levels of ability or incentives, the momentum effect may also be present in
states where the advantaged player is trailing in the game.
To test this prediction, we estimated the momentum effect where one player has
an advantage over the other one in terms of skills or incentives. We considered four
situations of inequalities in skills and incentives between players. First, we look at
the effect of asymmetries in professional ranking (Association of Tennis Professionals
21Results for different bandwidths and donut sizes can be found in the Supplementary Material.
22We also investigated how players’ sum of effort varies for different scorelines. Using the duration
of the point (measured with the number of bounces) as a proxy for the sum of effort, we found
players expend more effort on points with symmetric scoreline as would be predicted by our model.
We included these results in Section: 2.5.3.
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Male players Female players
(2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
5.37 0.02 14.10*
(0.502) (0.998) (0.044)
(420) (601) (561)
(1,0) (1,1)
5.32 20.41*
(0.386) (0.017)
(820) (394)
(0,0)
2.46
(0.706)
(792)
Symmetric 10.57*
scorelines (0.011)
(1, 747)
Asymmetric 3.83
corelines (0.338)
(1, 841)
(2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
6.61 14.95 2.2
(0.564) (0.131) (0.786)
(215) (320) (395)
(1,0) (1,1)
−8.4 −0.74
(0.303) (0.945)
(408) (220)
(0,0)
−2.78
(0.73)
(395)
Symmetric −0.26
scorelines (0.96)
(1, 010)
Asymmetric 3.18
scorelines (0.564)
(943)
Table 2.3: Wald estimator (in percent) of the effect of winning a point on the prob-
ability of winning the next depending on the scoreline, from the point of view of the
player ahead in the game (bandwidth of 4 cm and a donut of 1 cm). The scores 30-30
and 40-40 are merged in (2,2), since they are strategically equivalent in the game of
tennis (see Figure 1). P-values and sample size are indicated below each coefficient.
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Male players
Player
better ranked
Player
serving
Player
ahead in set
Player
ahead in match
Ahead in the game −0.06 4.08 14.93 −2.58
(0.992) (0.371) (0.346) (0.738)
898 1, 213 104 452
Symmetric scoreline 10.98** 9.82* 5.13 12.18*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.602) (0.030)
1, 646 1, 747 234 786
Trailing in the game 4.70 3.15 27.96 5.65
(0.405) (0.649) (0.104) (0.549)
837 628 116 383
All 6.78* 6.71* 12.68 7.10
(0.024) (0.015) (0.091) (0.084)
3, 381 3, 588 454 1, 621
Female players
Player
better ranked
Player
serving
Player
ahead in set
Player
ahead in match
Ahead in the game 5.53 1.56 −5.01 6.33
(0.496) (0.819) (0.796) (0.623)
367 556 55 160
Symmetric scoreline −1.59 −1.23 10.26 −5.72
(0.779) (0.805) (0.528) (0.531)
742 1010 126 313
Trailing in the game 3.48 3.20 −1.90 −20.85
(0.724) (0.724) (0.892) (0.081)
320 387 141 126
All 1.52 0.51 2.49 −6.79
(0.717) (0.890) (0.792) (0.289)
1, 429 1, 953 322 599
Table 2.4: Wald estimator (in percent) of the effect of winning a point on the prob-
ability of winning the next depending on the scoreline in the game from the point of
view of the the player who is best ranked (first column). Using the ATP rankings for
male players and in the WTA rankings for female players, the player serving (second
column). The player ahead in the set by at least one break (third column). The player
ahead in the match by at least one set (fourth column). Bandwidth is 4 cm and donut
1 cm. P-values and sample size indicated below each coefficient. * significance 5%, **
at 1%.
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(ATP) for male players, Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) for female players) which
are indicative of different levels of achievements in the last 12 months. Second, we
compared servers and receivers. Serving creates a substantial difference in the chance
to win the point and the game, so it is a natural asymmetry between the players.
Third, we considered situations where one player is ahead in the set by at least one
break.23 Such a lead puts him/her in a very good position to win the set. Finally,
we considered situations where one player is ahead in the match by one set or more.
In all these situations, the advantaged player should find it easier or have a greater
incentive to win the game. As a consequence, the momentum could appear for states
where this advantaged player is trailing. Table 2.4 shows such estimates for these four
situations: when the player considered is ahead in the game, when the scoreline is
symmetric, or when the player is trailing in the game. For symmetric scorelines, the
momentum effect is almost always significant for males. For asymmetric scorelines,
the point estimates tend to be higher for male players when the advantaged players
is trailing, in line with theoretical predictions. Though, they are not significant. Like
for all previous results, we do not find evidence of a momentum effect for female
players.
Within our conceptual framework, these results may suggest the asymmetries
in skills and incentives we are considering here are not pronounced enough for a
momentum to appear when the advantaged player is trailing. Hence, the momentum
is still strongest for symmetric scorelines.
Effect on effort expenditure
As in most dynamic contest models, in our model the strategic momentum emerges
as a consequence of players’ decisions in terms of resource/effort allocation. As tennis
is an interactive game, it is hard to isolate individual effort decisions. How much a
player runs or how hard he/she hits the ball is influenced by the shots’ speed and
location chosen by the opponent. However, Proposition 2.3.4. predicts that the sum
of efforts itself should vary as a function of the scoreline such that it is greatest when
23The leading player has won a game where the other player served.
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the players’ rewards to win the point are closer to each other.
In the case of a tennis point, the duration of the point is likely to be a good
indication of the sum of effort expended on that point. It is reasonable to assume
that points are going to last longer when no player gives up. The main driving force of
the momentum effect is the discouragement effect for the player lagging behind. One
can expect that this discouragement leads players to give up quicker during points,
leading these points to be shorter in duration.24 Therefore, we investigate how the
duration of points varies for different scorelines to provide complementing evidence
for the pattern of momentum.
In order to test Proposition 2.3.4, we extracted the number of bounces in each
point. We then use our identification strategy to assess whether there is a negative
effect on players’ effort when the scoreline moves away from a symmetric score. We
focus on points where the ball gets close to the line. To control for the length of the
point where the ball landed close to the line, we define 𝑛*𝑡 the number of bounces at
the time the ball lands close to the line (𝑛*𝑡 > 1, since we do not include the serves).25
Let’s define 𝑛𝑡+1 as the total amount of bounces in the next point. We are interesed
in 𝜏𝐹𝑅𝐷,𝑛 =
E(𝑛𝑡+1−𝑛*𝑡 |𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛)−E(𝑛𝑡+1−𝑛*𝑡 |𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡)
E(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛)−E(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡) , the effect in the change in number of
bounces caused by winning the point.
Table 2.5 shows 𝜏𝐹𝑅𝐷,𝑛 for each scoreline from the point of view of the server
(using a bandwidth of 4 cm). It shows that part of the decrease away from the
symmetric scoreline is causal, with the number of bounces being significantly lower
when the server moves to (2,0) compared to a move to (1,1) and when he moves to
(3,0) compared to (2,1). The points’ duration therefore decrease when the server takes
a substantial advantage in the game. This suggests that the sum of effort expended
in a point varies as a function of the players’ relative positions in the way predicted
by Proposition 2.3.4.
24This is likely to be the case on average. Obviously, on specific points, one player making a
greater effort may lead to him/her winning the point in fewer shots.
25Note that 𝑛*𝑡 is a proxy for the effort expended in the point, but it is not the total number of
bounces in the point.
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Male players Female players
(2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
−2.27** −1.59 −1.15
(0.003) (0.055) (0.203)
(307) (374) (561)
(1,0) (1,1) (1,2)
−1.75* −1.30 0.98
(0.028) (0.188) (0.494)
(532) (394) (227)
(0,0) (0,1) (0,2)
1.05 −2.04 −1.11
(0.126) (0.091) (0.586)
(792) (288) (113)
Server −1.85**
leading (0.000)
(1, 213)
Symmetric −0.24
scorelines (0.617)
(1, 747)
Receiver −0.80
leading (0.343)
(628)
(2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
−1.87 0.40 −1.84
(0.163) (0.789) (0.054)
(122) (180) (395)
(1,0) (1,1) (1,2)
0.21 −0.51 2.06
(0.815) (0.655) (0.184)
(254) (220) (140)
(1,0) (1,1) (1,2)
0.12 −0.51 2.26
(0.878) (0.692) (0.283)
(395) (154) (93)
Server −0.22
leading (0.747)
(556)
Symmetric −0.79
scorelines (0.146)
(1, 010)
Receiver 1.08
leading (0.238)
(387)
Table 2.5: Wald estimator (in percent) of the effect of winning a point on the number
of bounces in the next point depending on the scoreline (with a bandwidth of 4 cm
and a donut of 1 cm) from the point of view of the server. The scores 30-30 and 40-40
are merged in (2,2), since they are strategically equivalent in the game of tennis (see
Figure 1). P-values and sample size are indicated below each coefficient. * indicates
significance at the 5% level.
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2.5.4 Alternative explanations
Learning
Models of contests typically assumes that players’ strength are common knowledge.
This is obviously a simplifying assumption and one may assume that in many contest
situations, players do not know exactly the strength of their opponent, and sometimes
not even fully their own. It is easy to foresee how a momentum effect could arise
from a mechanism of learning during the contest. From past victories, a player could
learn that he/she is stronger that the opponent. Difference in strength can easily
be conceived as leading to differences in incentives as a weaker opponent either faces
higher costs of effort or is required to expend more effort to win. As a consequence, one
could expect a momentum effect to arise from players learning about their differences
in strength from their past opposition.
Whilst this line of argument is intuitive, optimal strategies in dynamic contests
with asymmetric information are much more complex than this simple description. It
is certainly for this reason that there is only limited work within such a framework.
A notable exception is the study of Münster (2009) who models a repeated contest
with players who are ignorant of the ability of their opponent. Noticably, the main
result of the model is not the apparition of a momentum effect but the decision from
high ability contestants to put in low effort in early rounds in order to deceive their
opponent into believing that they have a low ability.
Notwithstanding this result, we investigate whether learning could be an explana-
tion of the momentum effect we observe. To do so, we compare how the momentum
effect evolves during the match. If it is due to learning, it should arguably be larger
at the beginning of the match where players are gauging their respective strengths.
On the contrary, one would expect players to have a better idea of their own and
their opponent’s strength towards the end of the match.
Table 2.6 shows the momentum depending on which set players are in. The
splitting of the sample makes the estimated momentum effect quite imprecise and
none of them are significant at the conventional level. It is however noticeable that
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Set 1 2 3 4 5
Male
8.57 7.01 7.04 9.99 -15.62
(0.084) (0.111) (0.265) (0.451) (0.558)
1, 369 1, 342 649 157 71
Female
9.21 -3.44 -7.21
(0.114) (0.542) (0.438)
867 821 265
Table 2.6: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the next depending
on the set for a bandwidth of 4 cm and a donut of 1 cm.
the momentum effect is almost constant over the first three sets for male players. This
pattern does not suggest that the momentum effect we measure is driven by learning.
Note that the characteristics of our setting are unlikely to make learning the preferred
explanation. As we focus on points won almost by chance, rational players should
not infer much information about their relative strength from these points.26
Psychological momentum
The momentum predicted by our model of dynamic contests comes from the strategic
response of players to an asymmetry in incentives between the players as a function of
their relative position in the contest. It is also sometimes suggested that a momentum
can arise for psychological reasons (Mago, Sheremeta, and Yates 2013). There is no
formal model as such of psychological momentum. In many cases, it is fully compatible
with the economic framework with a psychological momentum arising from relative
position in the contest. However, the psychological momentum is often presented as
being path dependent. In our framework, strategies in a given state (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) are fully
determined by the payoffs in that state. A path dependent momentum would suggest
that the past sequence of wins and losses preceding a given state can influence the
player’s winning chances in that state.
26Obviously, players may still make such inferences from these points, if players process information
about their own ability in a biased manner (Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat 2011).
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To investigate whether the momentum we observe is path dependent, we compared
the momentum we observe for different paths taken by players to reach the considered
scoreline. Specifically let’s consider the scores (1,1), (2,2) and (2,1). In each of these
scores each player has at least won and lost one point. Focusing on such situations
we can test whether the momentum observed for the given scoreline differs depending
on whether the winning player won or lost the precedent point. For instance, is the
momentum larger if player A wins at (1,1), reaching (2,1) when he is on a streak,
coming back from (0,1) or when player B has just caught back with him after a
(1,0)? Table 2.7 compares the momentum effect for each of these scorelines depending
on whether the winning player had won or lost the precedent point. For men, the
momentum after scorelines of (1,1) is almost identical in each situation. For (2,2)
the two point estimates of the momentum are larger when the last point was won
but both coefficients are well within one standard error from each others. For (2,1)
scorelines, there is no significant momentum effect, whether the previous point was
won or lost. For women, there is no significant momentum whether the previous was
won or lost, and even the point estimate of the effect is greater after a previous point
lost for the scorelines (2,2).
Overall these results do not suggest that our main momentum effect is driven by
path dependence such that the momentum effect depends on the path the players
took to reach a specific scoreline. The pattern of momentum we observe (such as
the fact that it is greater for symmetric scorelines) suggests that an economic model
predicting players strategies from the evolution of their incentives in the dynamic
contest is enough to explain the observed behaviour, without the need for additional
psychological hypotheses.27
27This absence of evidence of path dependence in our dataset echoes recent experimental finding
of no such psychological momentum in an experimental contest (Mago, Sheremeta, and Yates 2013).
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Male players Female players
Player 2
Player 1
Win t-1 Lose t-1 All
(1,1) 21.15 20.05 20.41
p-val (0.085) (0.09) (0.017)
SE 12.27 11.84 8.55
N (199) (195) (394)
(2,2) 17.82 10.41 14.10*
p-val (0.072) (0.299) (0.044)
SE 9.90 10.03 7.01
N (292) (269) (561)
(2,1) 5.61 -11.04 0.02
p-val (0.506) (0.359) (0.998)
SE 8.43 12.04 6.92
N (385) (216) (601)
Player 2
Player 1
Win t-1 Lose t-1 All
(1,1) 1.72 -4.01 -0.74
(0.904) (0.799) (0.945)
14.17 15.78 10.67
(105) (115) (220)
(2,2) -6.29 11.54 2.20
(0.544) (0.352) (0.786)
10.36 12.40 8.07
(197) (198) (395)
(2,1) 20.10 6.16 14.95
(0.112) (0.700) (0.131)
12.64 15.99 9.89
(205) (115) (320)
Table 2.7: Wald estimator (in percent) of the effect of winning a point on the proba-
bility of winning the next, depending on the path taken by the players to reach the
scores (1,1), (2,2) and (2,1) (with a bandwidth of 4 cm and a donut of 1 cm).
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2.6 Conclusion
Tournaments are institutional designs which have attracted a lot of attention for their
ability to motivate agents to expend effort. However, this effect on agents’ behaviour
critically depends on their ability to identify and react to their incentives during the
competition. Most tournaments taking place in the field are dynamic contests as they
take place over time. Agents have to adjust their strategies depending on the evolution
of their relative place in the contest, which affects their expected final rewards. It
is not necessarily trivial for agents to figure out the optimal way to respond to the
evolution of their standing in a dynamic contest.
For this reason, studying agents’ reactions to their relative positions in contests
brings valuable insights into how tournaments work in practice as institutions shaping
agents’ behaviour. In this context, our study sheds new light on how well trained
agents behave in a dynamic contest. Using a large and precise dataset tracking the
play of the ball in professional tennis matches, we have investigated whether players’
reactions to incentive changes in a tennis contest can be predicted by economic theory.
We find evidence of a momentum effect for male players; winning a point in a game
increases their chance to win the next one. Importantly, we are able to test predictions
regarding specific patterns of this momentum effect as a function of the state in
the dynamic contest. Our findings are in line with the theory which predicts the
momentum effect to be stronger when players are in a close contest and when they are
nearing the final states of the contest. These results suggest the observed momentum
effect is a consequence of variations in incentives which occur in a dynamic contest.
However, we do not find evidence of such an effect for female players. This points
to a possible gender difference in the momentum effect. Previous research on gender
differences in behaviour in competitive environments has established men tend to have
a greater preference for competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007),
and they also tend to perform better than females in mixed tournaments (Gneezy,
Niederle, and Rustichini 2003). Our results suggest men may adopt more efficient
strategies in dynamic contests by modulating effort as a function of the importance of
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the stakes present at any given moment in time. As a large part of gender inequalities
arise in competitive settings such as promotion tournaments, this possible gender
difference in strategic behaviour would be worth investigating further.
Note that the evidence we present in favour of a strategic momentum does not
necessarily mean male players’ behaviour is optimal. There is widespread empirical
evidence of overdispersion in contest whereby contenders invest more resources (time,
effort, money) than what equilibrium strategies would require. In the case of a dy-
namic contest, such an overdispersion can appear if players continue to expend a lot
of effort even when they no longer have a good chance to win the contest. The quote
from Novak Djokovic in the introduction may suggest that, while male professional
players react to incentive changes in a tennis game, they may fail to do so optimally
by expending too much effort on minor points.
As tennis is an individual sport, agency or team production arguments are un-
likely to be an issue, making it an ideal setting to test contest theories (Abramitzky,
Einav, Kolkowitz, and Mill 2012). However, in many tournaments teams of individ-
uals oppose each other. Building on our results, it would be valuable to investigate
how teams react to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. In comparison to
competing individuals, teams decision making presents more challenges. First, in
many cases players incentives do not align perfectly with the team’s goal, even when
a clear optimal team strategy exists (Gauriot and Page 2015). Second, even when
such incentive conflicts do not exist, optimal strategies may be harder to achieve
if players need to coordinate when several equilibrium strategies exist. Conversely,
teams may have a greater ability to use either the knowledge of their best members
or the “wisdom of the crowd” to approximate equilibrium strategies.
Finally, the well established evidence of individuals’ concerns for relative posi-
tions transforms many non-agonistic situations into “contest for status”. This poten-
tially extends the relevance of contest theory beyond formal contests within and
between economic organisations. Contests for status may play a significant role
both in the area of consumption choice (Hopkins and Kornienko 2004, Kuhn, Koore-
man, Soetevent, and Kapteyn 2011) and for working decisions within organisations
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(Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi 2007, Besley and Ghatak 2008). Such decisions take place
over time with agents adapting their consumption and work choices as a function of
their relative standing. Understanding how agents react to changes in relative position
during dynamic contests may have a wide range of applications in economics.
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2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 2.3.2. To prove Proposition 2.3.2., we start with the tug-of-war part of
the tennis game and use the results from Konrad and Kovenock (2005). The tug-
of-war part of the tennis game has a possible infinite horizon. However Konrad and
Kovenock show that each point is played as an individual all-pay auction where the
players’ strategies are purely determined by one of the three states they are in. There
is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in such a game characterised by the existence
of “tipping states” where both contestants invest substantial amounts of effort to win.
For other states around these tipping states, an asymmetry in incentives creates an
advantage for one of the players. Relative to Konrad and Kovenock, we introduce
the possibility of a positive and intermediary prize ∆ ≥ 0. The size of this prize has
no effect on equilibrium continuation values in each state as the intermediate prizes
are netted out from a higher effort level of contestants. The proof of existence and
uniqueness of a Markov perfect equilibrium in the tug-of-war relies only on states’
continuation values and it can therefore be extended to the case with a positive
intermediary prize. The magnitude of ∆ does impact the equilibrium distribution of
efforts and the respective winning probabilities in each individual points (we describe
this effect below). When 𝑍𝐴 = 𝑍𝐵 = 𝑍, the continuation values at the equilibrium are
given by Proposition 1 from Konrad and Kovenock (2005): 𝑣𝐴(3, 2) = 𝛿𝑍, 𝑣𝐵(3, 2) =
0; 𝑣𝐴(2, 2) = 0, 𝑣𝐵(2, 2) = 0; 𝑣𝐴(2, 3) = 0, 𝑣𝐵(2, 3) = 𝛿𝑍. The state (2,2) is the only
tipping state.
By plugging these values as end values of the game of tennis, one can use the
method of Konrad and Kovenock (2009) to solve the rest of the game. Relative to
their model of a multibattle contest we introduce a discount factor 𝛿 < 1. This
changes the continuation values and winning probabilities without changing their
results qualitatively. By backward induction the continuation values are well defined
and uniquely determine point prizes and equilibrium strategies at each point. With
the previous result of existence and uniqueness of a Markov perfect equilibrium in
the tug-of-war part of the tennis game, there is therefore a unique Markov perfect
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equilibrium in the whole game. At any point, the prizes for the players to win the
point are defined as:
⎧⎨⎩ 𝑧𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛿𝑣𝐴(𝑖 + 1, 𝑗)− 𝛿𝑣𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗 + 1) + ∆𝑧𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛿𝑣𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗 + 1)− 𝛿𝑣𝐵(𝑖 + 1, 𝑗) + ∆. (2.2)
And the contination values are:
⎧⎨⎩ 𝑣𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗) = max(0, 𝑧𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗)− 𝑧𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗)) + 𝛿𝑣𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗 + 1)𝑣𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) = max(0, 𝑧𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗)− 𝑧𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗)) + 𝛿𝑣𝐵(𝑖 + 1, 𝑗). (2.3)
At each point the outcome is determined by an all-pay auction. Assume that
𝑧𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗) ≥ 𝑧𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) (the result is symmetric if 𝑧𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) ≥ 𝑧𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗)). Following Hillman
and Riley (1989), the players’ winning probabilities at each point are:
⎧⎨⎩ 𝑝𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1−
𝑧𝐵(𝑖,𝑗)
2𝑧𝐴(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑝𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑧𝐵(𝑖,𝑗)
2𝑧𝐴(𝑖,𝑗)
.
(2.4)
By backward induction, equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) uniquely determine prizes,
continuation values and winning probabilities for every point of the game. From the
winning probabilities, the momentum effects after each point are found to be:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝜇2,2 = 1− Δ𝛿𝑍+Δ
𝜇1,1 = 1− Δ𝛿2𝑍+Δ
𝜇0,0 = 1− Δ𝛿3𝑍+Δ
𝜇1,0 = 𝜇0,1 = 1/2− Δ2(𝑍(𝛿2−𝛿3)+Δ)
𝜇2,1 = 𝜇1,2 = 1/2− Δ2(𝑍(𝛿−𝛿2)+Δ)
𝜇2,0 = 𝜇0,2 =
Δ
2(𝛿2𝑍+Δ)
− Δ
2(𝑍(𝛿−𝛿2)+Δ) .
For 𝛿 ∈ [0, 1], the momentum effects 𝜇2,2, 𝜇1,1, 𝜇0,0, 𝜇1,0, 𝜇2,1 are positive. The
momentum effect 𝜇2,0 is the only one not to always be positive. 𝜇2,0 > 0 iff 𝛿 < 1/2.
This proves point (i) of Proposition 2.3.2.
It is also the case that 𝜇2,2 > 𝜇1,1 > 𝜇0,0 which proves point (iii) of Proposition
2.3.2.
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Figure 2-9: Momentum effects are larger for symmetric scorelines for 𝛿 large enough.
In addition 𝜇2,1 > 𝜇1,0. Given the previous results, the momentum effect for
symmetric scorelines will be larger than for the scorelines with one point difference
whenever 𝜇0,0 > 𝜇2,1. Let’s rewrite ∆ = 𝜆𝑍. Solving the inequality 𝜇0,0 − 𝜇2,1
for (𝛿, 𝜆) ∈ [0, 1]2 gives for each 𝜆 a 𝛿*(𝜆) such that 𝜇0,0 > 𝜇2,1 iff 𝛿 > 𝛿*(𝜆) and
𝜇0,0 ≤ 𝜇2,1 otherwise. The Figure 2-9 shows the plot of the function 𝛿*(𝜆). For
𝛿 > 1/2 the momentum effect is always larger for symmetric scorelines. This proves
the point (ii) of Proposition 2.3.2.
Proposition 2.3.3. We start by proving (i). Let Σ(𝑘) be the set of possible scoreline
after 𝑘 points have been played in the game Σ(𝑘) = {(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) : 𝑠𝐴 > 0, 𝑠𝐵 >
0, 𝑠𝐴 + 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑘}.28 We say that a state (𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) of Σ(𝑘) is a tipping state if and
only if 𝑧𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > ∆ and 𝑧𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > ∆.
At these tipping states, a momentum effect appears in the next state between
winners and losers. Given that 𝑧𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > ∆ and 𝑧𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > ∆, it means
that 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1) and 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1) > 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘).
28We use the same notation as Konrad and Kovenock (2009) however, for simplicity in our frame-
work, we define here 𝑘 as the number of individual contests already played while they defined as the
number of contests left to play.
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Furthermore, by definition of continuation values, we have either 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑘− 𝑖𝑘) > 0
and 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) = 0 or 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) = 0 and 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > 0.
The same applies for state (𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1). As a consequence 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘)
and 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) cannot be jointly positive as it would contradict the inequality
𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘− 𝑖𝑘 + 1) > 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘− 𝑖𝑘). They cannot be jointly equal to zero either as it
would contradict the inequality 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘 +1, 𝑘− 𝑖𝑘) > 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘− 𝑖𝑘 +1). Therefore it can
only be the case that 𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑘−𝑖𝑘) > 0, 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑘−𝑖𝑘) = 0, 𝑣𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘−𝑖𝑘+1) > 0,
𝑣𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1) = 0 which implies 𝑧𝐴(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) > 𝑧𝐵(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘) and
𝑧𝐵(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1) > 𝑧𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1). By definition of the equilibrium winning
probatilities, this implies 𝜇(𝑖𝑘,𝑘−𝑖𝑘) = 𝑝𝐴(𝑖𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘)− 𝑝𝐴(𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 − 𝑖𝑘 + 1) > 0.
We now prove (ii). Let’s consider the situation where 𝑍𝐵 < 𝑍𝐴, with 𝑍𝐵 close
enough from 𝑍𝐴 such that 𝑍𝐵 > 𝛿+𝛿
2−𝛿3
𝛿−𝛿3+1 𝑍𝐴. This condition implies 𝛿𝑍𝐵 > 𝛿
3𝑍𝐴.
From, Konrad and Kovenock (2005)’s Proposition 1 gives the equilibrium continuation
values, in that case in (3,2), (2,2) and (2,3).29
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑣𝐴(4, 2) = 𝑍𝐴
𝑣𝐴(3, 2) = 𝛿𝑍𝐴
𝑣𝐴(2, 2) =
1
1−𝛿2 (𝛿
2𝑍𝐴 − 𝛿3𝑍𝐴)
𝑣𝐴(2, 3) = 𝑣𝐴(2, 4) = 0.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑣𝐵(4, 2) = 𝑣𝐵(3, 2) = 𝑣𝐵(2, 2) = 0
𝑣𝐵(2, 3) =
1
1−𝛿2 (𝛿𝑍𝐵 − 𝛿3𝑍𝐴)
𝑣𝐵(2, 4) = 𝑍𝐵.
From these continuation values we can compute the prize in the states of Σ(𝑘),
(1,3) (2,2) (3,1).
29Using the notation of Konrad and Kovenock (2005)’s m=4 and 𝑗0 = 3.
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑧𝐴(3, 1) = 𝛿𝑣𝐴(4, 1)− 𝛿𝑣𝐴(3, 2) + ∆ = 𝛿𝑍𝐴 − 𝛿2𝑍𝐴 + ∆ > ∆
𝑧𝐵(3, 1) = 𝛿𝑣𝐵(3, 2)− 𝛿𝑣𝐵(4, 1) + ∆ = ∆.
𝑧𝐴(2, 2) = 𝛿𝑣𝐴(3, 2)− 𝛿𝑣𝐴(2, 3) + ∆ = 𝛿2𝑍𝐴 + ∆ > ∆
𝑧𝐵(2, 2) = 𝛿𝑣𝐵(2, 3)− 𝛿𝑣𝐵(3, 2) + ∆ = 𝛿 𝛿𝑍𝐵−𝛿3𝑍𝐴1−𝛿2 + ∆ > ∆.
𝑧𝐴(1, 3) = 𝛿𝑣𝐴(2, 3)− 𝛿𝑣𝐴(1, 4) + ∆ = ∆
𝑧𝐵(1, 3) = 𝛿𝑣𝐵(1, 4)− 𝛿𝑣𝐵(2, 3) + ∆ = 𝛿𝑍𝐵 − 𝛿 𝛿𝑍𝐵−𝛿3𝑍𝐴1−𝛿2 𝑍𝐴 + ∆ > ∆.
In that case, there is therefore a unique tipping state (𝑖4, 4− 𝑖4) in Σ(4) such that
𝑧𝐴(𝑖4, 4− 𝑖4) > ∆ and 𝑧𝐵(𝑖4, 4− 𝑖4) > ∆. This state is (2,2) with 𝑖4 = 2.
Using these prizes and continuation values, one can calculate the prizes for states
in Σ(3). Doing so, one finds a unique tipping state in (1,2) with prizes: 𝑧𝐴(1, 2) =
𝛿 𝛿
2𝑍𝐴−𝛿2𝑍𝐵
1−𝛿2 + ∆ and 𝑧𝐵(1, 2) = 𝛿
2𝑍𝐵 + ∆. Pursuing the backward induction process,
one finds that for 𝑍𝐵 > 𝛿𝑍𝐴𝛿−𝛿2+1 , then (1,1) is a tipping state in Σ(2). This inequality is
respected for the initial condition we have imposed on 𝑍𝐵. From (1,1), by backward
induction, 𝑍𝐴 > 𝑍𝐵 implies that (0,1) is a tipping state in Σ(1). Finally, for 𝑍𝐵 close
enough from 𝑍𝐴, with 𝑍𝐵 > 𝛿+𝛿
2−𝛿3
𝛿−𝛿3+1 𝑍𝐴 (the condition we posed initially) one finds
by backward induction that (0,0) is also a tipping state. Figure 2-10 shows the range
of 𝜆 = 𝑍𝐵/𝑍𝐴 satisfying this condition for different values of 𝛿. When 𝑍𝐵 is close
enough from 𝑍𝐴 such that this condition is respected, the states (2,2), (1,2), (1,1),
(0,1) and (0,0) are tipping states. This proves the point (ii) of the Proposition.
Note that for lower values of 𝑍𝐵 relative to 𝑍𝐴, tipping points (and the associated
momentum) would still exist in the game, they would simply tend to move to more
asymmetric states where player A is trailing player B.
Proposition 2.3.4. Following from Proposition 2.3.2.’s proof, by backward induction,
54
Figure 2-10: Condition on 𝑍𝐵 for Proposition 2.3.3
equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) uniquely determine prizes, continuation values, and
winning probabilities for every point of the game. In addition, from Hillman and Riley
(1989) the agents expected sum of effort in any sub-contest (𝑠𝐴, 𝑆𝐵) is 𝐸(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) =
1
2
𝑧𝐵(1 +
𝑧𝐵
𝑧𝐴
). From this, we get for 𝑍𝐴 = 𝑍𝐵:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐸(2, 2) = 𝛿2𝑍𝐴 + ∆
𝐸(1, 1) = 𝛿3𝑍𝐴 + ∆
𝐸(0, 0) = 𝛿4𝑍𝐴 + ∆
Therefore we have 𝐸(2, 2) > 𝐸(1, 1) > 𝐸(0, 0) > ∆ > 𝐸(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵), for any asymmetric
scoreline (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵).
For 𝑍𝐵 < 𝑍𝐴, in non tipping points, the sum of effort is inferior to ∆ similarly
to the case above. Let’s consider a tipping point (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). Suppose, that 𝑧𝐴 > 𝑧𝐵
with 𝑧𝐴 = 𝜂𝑧𝐵 and 𝜂 ∈ [0, 1]. Let’s also write 𝑧𝐵 = 𝑥 + ∆ where 𝑥 is the part of
part of the sub-contest prize which stems from the grand contest incentives. We have
𝐸(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) =
1
2
(𝑥+ ∆)(1 + 1
𝜂
). For 𝑧𝐵 close enough from 𝑧𝐴, that is for 𝜂 close enough
from 1, we have 𝑥𝜂+1
𝜂−1 > ∆ which entails 𝐸(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) > ∆ and the effort at this tipping
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state is higher than at any non tipping state. The demonstration is identical in the
symmetric case where 𝑧𝐴 < 𝑧𝐵.
56
Chapter 3
Wimbledon Revisited
Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page and John Wooders
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Abstract
Minimax and its generalization to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone
of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpre-
dictable. In sharp contrast to prior results based on data obtained from laboratory
experiments, Walker and Wooders (2001) found that the serve and return behaviour
of professional tennis players in championship matches is largely consistent with the
predictions of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This finding has received additional
support from subsequent studies of both serves in tennis (Hsu, Huang, and Tang
2007) and penalty kicks in soccer (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose 2002, Palacios-
Huerta 2003). We re-examine the findings of Walker and Wooders employing data
set comprising over 300,000 serves from 3,172 tennis matches, which is approximately
100 times larger than in previous studies. The large number of matches in our dataset
necessitates the development of a novel statistical test to examine the joint null hy-
pothesis that each player in our sample equates the winning probability of serves left
and serves right. We show that this test is more powerful than the one introduced
in Walker and Wooders. Nonetheless, our findings even more strongly support the
original conclusion of Walker and Wooders that the serve and return behavior of
professionals conforms remarkably closely to mixed-strategy equilibrium play, except
that professionals switch their direction of serve too often to be consistent with ran-
domness. We find that the play of women conforms less closely to equilibrium than
that of men.
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3.1 Introduction
Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem and Nash’s notion of equilibrium for general games
are the foundations of modern game theory. Nash equilibrium, and its extension
to decision making in dynamic settings or settings with incomplete information, are
routinely applied in theoretical models and are the basis of much of our understanding
of strategic interaction. It is natural, therefore, to be concerned with the predictive
accuracy of the theory.
Laboratory experiments have been enormously successful in providing tightly con-
trolled tests of game theory. The results of these experiments, however, have not been
supportive of the theory for games with a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: human
subjects do not mix in the equilibrium proportions and subjects exhibit serial corre-
lation in their choices rather than the serial independence predicted by the theory.
Data from professional sports, however, has been far more supportive of the the-
ory. Walker and Wooders (2001), henceforth WW, argue using poker as a motivating
example, that while the rules of a game that requires unpredictability may be simple
to understand, it is far more difficult to understand how to play well. Student subjects
no doubt understand the rules, but they have neither the experience, the time, nor
the incentive to learn to play well. In professional sports, on the other hand, players
have typically devoted their lives to the game and they have substantial financial
incentives. Walker and Wooders (2001) shows that the serve and return behavior
of male championship professional tennis players is consistent with the Minimax hy-
pothesis and Nash equilibrium. Even the best tennis players, however, tend to switch
the direction of serve too often. Additional support for the theory has come from
Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007), henceforth HHT, who also study tennis, and from
(Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose 2002, Palacios-Huerta 2003), which study penalty
kicks in soccer.
The present paper returns to tennis but uses data from Hawk-Eye, a computerized
ball tracking system employed at Wimbledon and other top championship tennis
matches. Our data set contains the precise trajectory and bounce points of the ball
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for over 3000 matches and over 300,000 serves. We model a tennis match as composed
of four distinct types of “point games” that are distinguished by which player has the
serve and whether the player is serving from the ad or the deuce court. The main
testable hypothesis of the Minimax hypothesis is that each type of serve delivered
in equilibrium with positive probability in a given point game yields the same payoff
to the server. In particular, the server’s probability of winning the point should not
depend on the direction of the serve.1 The equilibrium probability of winning a point
may, of course, differ across the four different point games.
The large number point games in our data set requires that we introduce a novel
statistical test for our analysis. A crucial feature of this test is that it is exact. Under
the null hypothesis that the server’s probability of winning a point is the same for
serves in each direction (for a given point game 𝑖), the test statistic 𝑡𝑖 we generate
is uniformly distributed.2 We test the joint hypothesis that winning probabilities are
equalized in each point game in our entire data set by applying the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test to the empirical distribution of these 𝑡𝑖’s. From the known asymptotic
distribution of the KS test statistic, we can compute the associated p-value. The use
of the asymptotic distribution at this step is well justified for our data since we have
data for thousands of point games and thus thousands of 𝑡𝑖’s.
Constructing an exact test requires that the test statistic 𝑡𝑖 is randomized. Since
the “t-value” for each point game is random, the empirical c.d.f. of t-values we
construct is also random, as is the KS test statistic and its associated p-value. An
unusual feature of our approach is that, rather than simply reporting a single p-value
for our test, we instead report the empirical density of p-values obtained after running
the test many times.
We find that the serve and return behavior of male professional tennis players
conforms remarkably closely to the Minimax Hypthothesis (and equivalently mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium). Despite the enormous power of our statistical tests – due
1Nor should the winning probability depend on any other aspect of the serve (e.g., its spin), for
any type of serve delivered in equilibrium with positive probability.
2Hence we can construct a test of exactly 5% size by rejecting the null hypothesis if 𝑡𝑖 ≤ .25 or
𝑡𝑖 ≥ .975.
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to the large sample size and the greater power of our test – we can not reject the
null hypothesis that the payoff to the server is the same for serves in both directions.
We obtain this result for both first and second serves. For first serves, the empirical
density of p-values puts no weight on p-values below .05 (i.e., one would never reject
the joint null hypothesis at the 5% significance level). For second serves, it puts
almost no weight on p-values below .05.
The results for women, by contrast, also conform to theory but somewhat less
neatly. The empirical density function of p-values puts a 43.7% weight on p-values
of .05 or less for first serves, and a 16.7% weight on p-values of .05 or less for second
serves. Nonetheless, the behavior of female professional tennis players conforms far
more closely to equilibrium than the behavior of subjects in comparable laboratory
tests of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Applying our test to the data from O’Neill’s
(1987) classic experiment, we obtain an empirical density function of p-values with a
100% chance of a p-value less than .05. Hence the joint null hypothesis that winning
probabilities are equalized is resoundingly rejected based on the 5250 decisions of
O’Neill’s subjects whereas we obtain no such result for women despite having vastly
more data.
We show via Monte Carlo simulations that our test of whether winning proba-
bilities are equalized is substantially more powerful than the tests used in WW and
the rest of the literature. Its greater power means that it potentially overturns the
conclusions of prior studies when applied to that data, and indeed in some instances
it does. In a sample of 9 women’s matches and 8 juniors matches, Hsu, Huang, and
Tang (2007) find that servers equalize winning probabilities. Our test, applied to
their data, puts weights of 18.5% and 49.6%, respectively, on p-values of less than
.05. On the other hand, applying our test to WW’s (2001) data or HHT’s (2007)
data for men, we reaffirm their findings that the behavior of male professional tennis
players conforms to the Minimax hypothesis. In both cases, the empirical density of
p-value assigns zero probability to p-values of .05 or less.
A second implication of the theory is that the players’ choices of direction of serve
are serially independent. We reject serial independence for both men and women, for
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both first and second serves. Players switch the direction of their serve too frequently
to be consistent with randomness. Negative serial correlation in the direction of serve
is more pronounced for women than men, and is more pronounced for first serves
than second serves. For the second serve, it may be more important to deliver a
serve that is “in” than to be unpredictable. We show that women exhibit more serial
correlation in their choices than do men. We conject that since the serve is less
important in women’s tennis, there may be less of a selection pressure driving women
toward equilibrium play.
3.2 The Serve in Tennis
Following Walker and Wooders (2001) we model each point in a tennis match as a
2×2 normal-form game. The server chooses whether to serve to the receiver’s left (L)
or the receiver’s right (R). The receiver simultaneously chooses whether to overplay
left (L) or right (R).3 The probability that the server wins the point when he serves in
direction 𝑠 and the receiver overplays direction 𝑟 is denoted by 𝜋𝑠𝑟. Hence the game
for a point is represented as in Table: 3.1.
Receiver
L R
Server L 𝜋𝐿𝐿 𝜋𝐿𝑅
R 𝜋𝑅𝐿 𝜋𝑅𝑅
Table 3.1: The Game for a Point
Since one player or the other wins the point, the probability that the receiver wins
the point is 1 − 𝜋𝑠𝑟, and hence the game is completely determined by the server’s
winning probabilities.
The probability payoffs in Table: 3.1 will depend on the abilities of the two players
in the match and, in particular, on which player is serving. Likewise, the player with
the serve alternates between serving from the ad court (the left side of the court)
3For first serve by men, on average only 0.45 seconds elapses between the serve and the first
bounce.
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and from the deuce court (the right side). Since the players’ abilities may differ when
serving or receiving from one court or the other, the probability payoffs in Table:
3.1 may also depend upon whether the serve is from the ad or deuce court. We
assume that within a given match, the probability payoffs are completely determined
by which player has the serve and whether the serve is from the ad or deuce court.
Thus, there are four distinct “point” games in a match. We assume that in every point
game 𝜋𝐿𝐿 < 𝜋𝐿𝑅 and 𝜋𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝑅𝐿, i.e., the server wins the point with lower probability
(and the receiver with higher probability) when the receiver correctly anticipates the
direction of the serve. Under this assumption there is a unique Nash equilibrium and
it is in (strictly) mixed strategies.4
A tennis match is a complicated extensive form game: The first player to win at
least four points and to have won two more than his rival wins a game. The first
player to win at least six games and have won two more than his rival wins a set.
The first player to win three sets win the match.
The players, however, are interested in winning points only in so far as they are
the means by which they win the match. The link between the point games and
the overall match is provided in Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011), which defines
and analyzes a class of games (which includes tennis) called Binary Markov games.
Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011) shows that equilibrium play in the match consists
of playing, at each point, the equilibrium of the point game in which the payoffs are
the winning probabilities 𝜋𝑠𝑟. Thus equilibrium play depends only on which player
is serving and whether the point is an ad-court or a deuce-court point; it does not
otherwise depend on the current score or any other aspect of the history of play prior
to that point.
The first implication of theory follows from the fact that in a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium a player obtains the same payoff from all actions chosen with positive
probability in his equilibrium mixture. Thus, the server’s equilibrium payoff, i.e., the
equilibrium probability of winning a point, is the same for serves left and for serves
4Nash equilibrium and minimax coincide in two-player constant sum games, such as this one.
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right, when delivered from the same court.5 A second implication of equilibrium is
that the direction of the serve is serial independent.
3.3 The Data
Hawk-Eye is a computerized ball tracking system used in professional tennis and
other sports to precisely record the trajectory of the ball. Our data set consists of the
official Hawk-Eye data, for all matches played at the international professional level
where this technology was used, between March 2005 and March 2009. 6 Most of the
matches are from Grand slam and ATP (Association of Tennis Players) tournaments
Overall, the data set contains 3, 172 different singles matches. Table 3.2 provides a
breakdown of the match characteristics of our data.
Female Male All
Carpet 35 174 209
Surface Clay 130 366 496
Grass 95 204 299
Hard 917 1251 2168
Best of 3 1177 1400 2577
5 0 595 595
Davis Cup (Fed Cup) 8 18 26
Grand Slam 458 526 984
Olympics 19 16 35
Events ATP (Premier) 662 101 763
International - 473 473
Master - 825 825
Hopman Cup 30 36 66
Total 1117 1995 3172
Table 3.2: Match Characteristics
As the use of the Hawk-Eye system is usually limited to the main tournaments,
the data set contains a large proportion of matches from top tournaments (e.g., Grand
5The reduced-from model presented in Table: 3.1 is for first serves. However, one can show that
in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium the server’s probability of winning the second serve is the same
for serves left and serves right.
6Hawk-Eye has been used to resolve challenges to line calls since 2006.
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Slams). Within tournaments, the matches in our data set are more likely to feature
top players as the Hawk-Eye system is used on the main courts and was often absent
from minor courts at the time of our sample. As a consequence, the matches contained
in the data set tend to feature the best male and female players.
For each point played, our data set records the trajectory of the ball, as well as
the player serving, the current score, and the winner of the point.7 When the server
faults as a result of the ball failing to clear the net, then we extrapolate the path of
the serve to identify where the ball would have bounced had the net not intervened.
Figure: 3-1 is an representation of a tennis court and shows the actual (in blue) and
imputed (in red) ball bounces of first serves by men, for serves delivered from the
deuce court. The dashed lines in the figure are imaginary lines – not present on an
actual court – that divide the two “right service” courts and are used to distinguish
left serves from right serves.
Our analysis focuses on the location of the first bounce following a serve. As it
is evident from Figure: 3-1, such serves are typically delivered to the extreme left or
the extreme right of the deuce court. We classify the direction of a serve – left or
right – from the server’s perspective: A bounce on the left hand side of the court is
classified as a serve to the right if it is above the dashed line and a serve to the left
if it is below the dashed line. Likewise, a bounce on the right hand side of the court
is a serve to the right if it is below the dashed line.8
One could more finely distinguish serve directions, e.g., left, center, and right, but
doing so would not impact our hypothesis tests. So long as left and right are both
7Hawkeye records the path of the ball as a sequence of arcs between impacts of the ball with
a racket, the ground, or the net. Each arc (in three dimensions) is decomposed in three arcs, one
for each dimension – the 𝑥-axis, the 𝑦-axis, and the 𝑧-axis. Each of these arcs is encoded as a
polynomial equation with time as a variable. For each arc in three dimensions we have therefore
three polynomial equations (typically of degree 2 or 3) describing the motion of the ball in time and
space.
8More precisely, Hawk-Eye records each impact of the ball with the court by 51 coordinate pairs
(𝑥, 𝑦) that describe the perimeter of the elipse-shaped bounce point, where all distances are measured
in meters from the center of the court (with coordinates 𝑥 = 𝑦 = 0). A tennis court is 27 feet (8.2296
meters) wide. The deuce court is half as wide, i.e., 4.1148 meters. Hence in the deuce court on the
left hand side of Figure: 3-1 we have −4.1148 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 0. To classify the direction of the serve, we
select one of the 50 (𝑥, 𝑦) pairs at random. For 𝑥 < 0, a serve is to the right if 𝑦 > −2.0574 and to
the left if 𝑦 < −2.0574.
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in the support of the server’s equilibrium mixture, serves in each direction have the
same theoretical winning probability.
Figure 3-1: Ball Bounces for Deuce Court First Serves by Men. In blue the actual
bounces and in red the imputed ones.
Second serves are delivered at slower speeds than first serves and are less likely to
be a fault, but are also typically delivered to the left or right.
We observe a total of 479,103 first serves (318,628 for male and 160,475 for fe-
male). While Hawk-Eye automatically records bounce data, the names of the players,
the identity of the server and the score are entered manually. This leads to some dis-
crepancies, as a result of data entry errors. To ensure that the information use in our
analysis is correct, we check that the score evolved logically within a game: the game
should start at 0-0, and the score should be 1-0 if the server wins the first point and
0-1 if the receiver wins the point. We do this for every point within a game. If there
is even one error within a game, we drop the whole game. While conservative, this
approach ensures that our results are based on highly accurate data. After cleaning
the data set we have 337,184 first serves.
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Serve Gender Serves Point Games
1st serve Male 226,298 7,148
Female 110,886 4,108
2nd serve Male 86,702 7,148
Female 41,376 4,108
Table 3.3: Number of Serves
3.4 Testing for Equality of Winning Probabilities
For each “point game” 𝑖 we observe the number of serves to the left and right, 𝑛𝑖𝐿 and
𝑛𝑖𝑅. Let 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑆 and 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝐹 denote the number of first serves in direction 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿,𝑅} for
which the ultimate outcome was 𝑆 (success) – the server won the point, or 𝐹 (failure)
– the receiver won the point, respectively. Thus the data for point game 𝑖 can be
represented in the table below
𝐿 𝑅
𝑆 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝑆 𝑛
𝑖
𝑆 = 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿𝑆 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝑆
𝐹 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝐹 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝐹 𝑛
𝑖
𝐹 = 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿𝐹 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝐹
𝑛𝑖𝐿 = 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿𝑆 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿𝐹 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝑆 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝐹
3.4.1 Individual Play and The Fisher Exact Test
Let 𝑝𝑖𝑗 denote the true, but unknown, probability that the server will win the point
when the first serve is in direction 𝑗. We use the Fisher Exact test to test the null
hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 = 𝑝𝑖 for point game 𝑖, i.e., the probability that the server
wins the point is the same whether serving to the left or to the right. The beauty of
the Fisher Exact test is that it does not require knowledge of the true (but unknown)
value of 𝑝𝑖. Moreover, as an exact test, it does not rely on the asymptotic distribution
of the test statistic. As we shall see, the later is essential for constructing a valid test
of the joint hypothesis of the equality of winning probabilities, given the large number
of point games in our sample.
Let 𝑓(𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) denote the probability, under the null, that the server wins
𝑛𝐿𝑆 serves to the left, conditional on winning 𝑛𝑆 serves in total, after delivering
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𝑛𝐿 and 𝑛𝑅 serves to the left and the right, respectively, i.e., 𝑓(𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) ≡
Pr(𝑛𝐿𝑆|𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅). This conditional probability is computed as follows:
𝑓(𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) =
Pr(𝑛𝐿𝑆, 𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅)
Pr(𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅)
=
𝐵(𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝐿, 𝑝)𝐵(𝑛𝑅𝑆;𝑛𝑅, 𝑝)
𝐵(𝑛𝑆;𝑛𝐿 + 𝑛𝑅, 𝑝)
,
where 𝑛𝑅𝑆 = 𝑛𝑆 −𝑛𝐿𝑆 and 𝐵(𝑛𝑗𝑆;𝑛𝑗, 𝑝) is the binomial probability of winning 𝑛𝑗𝑆 of
𝑛𝑗 serves in direction 𝑗 when the winning probability is 𝑝. The last equality follows
from the fact that the binomial processes for serves left and right are independent.
By direct calculation we have
𝑓(𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) =
(︀
𝑛𝐿
𝑛𝐿𝑆
)︀
𝑝𝑛𝐿𝑆(1− 𝑝)𝑛𝐿−𝑛𝐿𝑆(︀ 𝑛𝑅
𝑛𝑅𝑆
)︀
𝑝𝑛𝑆−𝑛𝐿𝑆(1− 𝑝)𝑛𝑅−𝑛𝑅𝑆(︀
𝑛𝐿+𝑛𝑅
𝑛𝑆
)︀
𝑝𝑛𝑆(1− 𝑝)𝑛𝐿+𝑛𝑅−𝑛𝑆
=
(︀
𝑛𝐿
𝑛𝐿𝑆
)︀(︀
𝑛𝑅
𝑛𝑅𝑆
)︀(︀
𝑛𝐿+𝑛𝑅
𝑛𝑆
)︀ .
Of critical importance, this conditional probability is exact for finite samples and does
not depend on 𝑝.9 Let 𝐹 (𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) be the associated c.d.f., i.e.,
𝐹 (𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) =
∑︁𝑛𝐿𝑆
𝑘=max(𝑛𝑆−𝑛𝑅,0)
𝑓(𝑘;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅).
According to the Fisher exact test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% signifi-
cance level if 𝐹 (𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) ≤ .025 or 𝐹 (𝑛𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑆, 𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) ≥ .975.
For any given marginal distribution, since the density 𝑓 above is discrete, a 5%
test will not typically have a size of exactly 5%. We employ a randomized test in
order to obtain a test of exactly the correct size. For each point game 𝑖, let 𝑡𝑖 be the
random test statistic given by a draw from the distribution 𝑈 [0, 𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅)]
if 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 takes its minimum value, i.e., 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 = 𝑛𝑖𝑆 − 𝑛𝑖𝑅, and from the distribution
𝑈 [𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 − 1;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅), 𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅)] otherwise. Under the null hypothesis
that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅, the test statistic 𝑡𝑖 is distributed 𝑈 [0, 1]. Hence rejecting the null
9It is defined for 𝑛𝐿𝑆 ∈ {max(𝑛𝑆 − 𝑛𝑅, 0), . . . ,min(𝑛𝑆 , 𝑛𝐿)}. We require in particular that
𝑛𝐿𝑆 ≥ max(𝑛𝑆 − 𝑛𝑅, 0), i.e., the number of winning left serves must be (i) non-negative, and (ii) at
least as great at the total number of winning serves minus the number of right serves. Likewise, we
require 𝑛𝐿𝑆 ≤ min(𝑛𝑆 , 𝑛𝐿), i.e., the number of winning left serves can not exceed either the number
of winning serves overall or the number of left serves.
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hypothesis if 𝑡𝑖 ≤ .025 or 𝑡𝑖 ≥ .975 yields a test of exactly size .05. We refer to this
test as the randomized Fisher exact test. The 𝑡𝑖’s obtained from this test will be used
in the next section to test the join null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for every 𝑖.
3.4.2 An Illustrative Example
Consider the hypothetical data below, for three different point games, all of which
have the same marginal distributions.
𝐿 𝑅
𝑆 4 6 10
𝐹 11 0 11
15 6
𝑓(4; 10, 15, 6) = .0039
𝐹 (4; 10, 15, 6) = .0039
𝐿 𝑅
𝑆 8 2 10
𝐹 7 5 11
15 6
𝑓(8; 10, 15, 6) = .2737
𝐹 (8; 10, 15, 6) = .9063
𝐿 𝑅
𝑆 10 0 10
𝐹 5 6 11
15 6
𝑓(10; 10, 15, 6) = .0085
𝐹 (10; 10, 15, 6) = 1.00
The hypothetical data considers three (𝑛𝐿𝑆 = 4, 8, and 10) of 7 possible realizations of
𝑛𝐿𝑆 (i.e., 𝑛𝐿𝑆 = 4, . . . , 10) consistent with the marginal distributions of the example.
These realizations are naturally ordered from the one most favorable to 𝑝𝑖𝐿 < 𝑝𝑖𝑅 (i.e.,
𝑛𝐿𝑆 = 4) to the one least favorable to 𝑝𝑖𝐿 < 𝑝𝑖𝑅 (i.e., 𝑛𝐿𝑆 = 10).
For this hypothetical data, at the 5% significance level the Fisher exact test rejects
the null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for the data only for the left-most (𝑛𝑆 = 4) and
the right-most (𝑛𝑆 = 10) tables: the data in the left-most table favors the alternative
hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 < 𝑝𝑖𝑅, while the data on the right-most table favors the alternative
𝑝𝑖𝐿 > 𝑝
𝑖
𝑅. The size of this test, however, is only .0039 + .0085 = 0.0124.
The randomized Fisher exact test likewise rejects the null hypothesis with prob-
ability 1 if 𝑛𝑆 = 4 or 𝑛 = 10. However, it also rejects the null with probability .413
if 𝑛𝑆 = 5 and with probability .194 if 𝑛𝑆 = 9.10 The null is not rejected otherwise.
10In particular, if 𝑛𝑆 = 5 then 𝑡𝑖 v 𝑈 [.0039, .0550] and the null is rejected if 𝑡𝑖 ≤ .025; if 𝑛𝑆 = 9
then 𝑡𝑖 v 𝑈 [.9064, .9915] and the null is rejected if 𝑡𝑖 ≥ .975.
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Hence the size of the test is
𝑓(4; 10, 15, 6) + .413𝑓(5; 10, 15, 6) + .194𝑓(9; 10, 15, 6) + 𝑓(10; 10, 15, 6) = .05.
One can think of a realization of 𝑛𝑆 = 5 or 𝑛𝑆 = 9, while not being sufficiently
extreme to lead to an outright rejection the null, as providing some negative evidence
against it and thus the null is rejected with positive probability.
We compare the performance of the randomized Fisher exact test and the Pearson
Goodness of Fit test of the null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for the WW (2001) data
set. As reported in WW (2001), the Pearson goodness of fit test rejects this null for
one point game at the 5% level and another at the 10% level. The Fisher Exact test
rejects this null for two points games at the 10% level.11 Under the null, we expect
two rejections at the 5% level and four at the 10% level. Both tests perform similarly
for this sample, and both reject the null at roughly the rate predicted by the theory.
The data is consistent with the minimax hypothesis at the individual level.
Table 3.4 shows the percentage of points games for which equality of winning
probabilities is rejected for the Hawk-Eye data, for men and women and for both
first and second serves. For point game 𝑖, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5%
level if either 𝑡𝑖 ≤ .025 or 𝑡𝑖 ≥ .975. Since 𝑡𝑖 is random, each percentage is computed
for 5000 trials; the table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
of these trials. For men, for both first and second serves, the (mean) frequency at
which the null is rejected at the 5% significance level is very close to 5%, the level
expected if the null is true.12 For women, the null is rejected at a somewhat higher
11The Pearson Goodness of fit test of the equality of two (binomial) distributions is based on the
test statistic
𝑄𝑖 =
∑︁
𝑗∈{𝐿,𝑅}
[︃
(𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑆 − 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗)2
𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗
+
(𝑛𝑖𝑗𝐹 − (1− 𝑝𝑖)𝑛𝑖𝑗)2
(1− 𝑝𝑖)𝑛𝑖𝑗
]︃
,
where 𝑝𝑖 = (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅𝑆)/(𝑛
𝑖
𝐿 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅) is the maximum likelihood estimate of 𝑝
𝑖, the true probability
that the server wins the point, under the null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝
𝑖
𝑅. If this null hypothesis is
true, then 𝑄𝑖 is asymptotically distributed chi-square with 1 degree of freedom.
12Since each point game has fewer observations of second serves than first serves, the stochastic
nature of the 𝑡’s will tend to be more important for second serves. This is evidenced by the higher
standard deviations for second serves. Likewise, since we tend to observe fewer serves for women,
the standard deviations are higher for women.
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Setting # Point Games rejections at 5% rejections at 10%
Men (1st Serve) 7,198 5.06% (0.16) 10.01% (0.20)
Men (2nd Serve) 7,198 5.02% (0.23) 10.13% (0.30)
Women (1st Serve) 4,108 5.35% (0.22) 10.50% (0.28)
Women (2nd Serve) 4,108 4.86% (0.30) 9.64% (0.40)
Table 3.4: Rejection Rate (Fisher Exact Test) for 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 (5000 trials)
than expected rate (5.35%) on first serves, and a slightly lower than expected rate
(4.86%) for second serves.
At the individual level, the rate at which equality of winning probabilities is
rejected at the 5% or 10% significance level seems – to the eye – to be roughly
consistent with the theory.
3.4.3 Aggregate Play
We next consider the joint null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for each point game 𝑖.
WW (2001) test this hypothesis by applying the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test
to the empirical distribution of the 𝑝-values obtained from the Pearson Goodness
of fit test described above. Under the null hypothesis, each 𝑝-value is uniformly
distributed as the number of serves in each point game grows large. They find that
the null is resoundingly rejected for O’Neill (1987) data, whereas the null is not
rejected when applied to the serve and return data from professional tennis.13 Other
authors have followed this approach to test for equality of winning probabilities in
professional soccer (Palacios-Huerta 2003) and laboratory experiments with human
subjects (Levitt, List, and Reiley 2010, Van Essen and Wooders 2015).
Here we construct a new test of the joint null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for each
point game 𝑖. Since our test is constructed from the randomized Fisher Exact test,
it has the crucial advantage that the 𝑡 values (the analogue to the 𝑝-values in WW
(2001)) are uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis even for finite samples.
13For the 50 “point games” in O’Neill’s data, the KS test statistic is 𝑘 = 1.704 (𝑝-value of .006),
while for the 40 point games in Walker and Wooders’ data set the KS test statistic is 𝑘 = .670
(𝑝-value of .76).
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Moreover, as we will show later, the test is more powerful than the WW (2001) test.
We begin by applying this new test to the WW (2001) data. As described earlier,
for each point game 𝑖, let 𝑡𝑖 be the random test statistic given by a draw from the
distribution 𝑈 [0, 𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅)] if 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 takes its minimum value of 𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 = 𝑛𝑖𝑆 −
𝑛𝑖𝑅, and from the distribution 𝑈 [𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆−1;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅), 𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛𝑖𝑅)] otherwise.
Under the null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅, the test statistic 𝑡𝑖 is distributed 𝑈 [0, 1]. Since
the 𝑡𝑖’s are i.i.d. draws from a continuous distribution, we can test the joint hypothesis
by applying the KS test to the empirical c.d.f. of the 𝑡 values. Formally, the KS test
is as follows: The hypothesized c.d.f. for the 𝑡-values is the uniform distribution,
𝐹 (𝑥) = 𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1]. The empirical distribution of the 40 𝑡-values reported in
Table 1, denoted 𝐹 (𝑥), is given by 𝐹 (𝑥) = 1
40
∑︀40
𝑖=1 𝐼[0,𝑥](𝑡
𝑖), where 𝐼[0,𝑥](𝑡𝑖) = 1 if
𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑥 and 𝐼[0,𝑥](𝑡𝑖) = 0 otherwise. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic
𝐾 =
√
40 sup𝑥∈[0,1] |𝐹 (𝑥)− 𝑥| has a known distribution (see p. 509 of Boes, Graybill,
and Mood (1974)).
The left panel of Figure: 3-2 shows one realization of empirical distribution of 𝑡
values for the WW (2001) data. For this realization, the value of the test statistic is
𝐾 = .538 and the associated 𝑝-value is .934. Thus the new test confirms the finding
of WW (2001) that the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities for
first serves does not even come close to being rejected for male professional tennis
players.14
Since the 𝑡 values are stochastic, the empirical c.d.f. and the KS test statistic are
also random. It is natural to question the robustness of the conclusion that the joint
null hypothesis is not rejected. The right panel of Figure: 3-2 shows the empirical
density of the p-values obtained after 5000 repetitions of the KS test. The horizontal
axis is divided into 100 equal-sized bins [0, .01], [.01, .02], . . . , [.99, 1.0] and so, if 5000
p-values were equally distributed across bins, then there would be 50 p-values per bin.
The vertical height of each bar in the histogram is the number of p-values observed in
the bin divided by 50. By construction, the area of the shaded region in the histogram
of Figure: 3-2 is one, and hence it is an empirical density function. The bins to the
14In WW (2001), the value of the KS test statistic was .670 and the associated p-value was .76.
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Figure 3-2: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (WW (2001) data). Empirical c.d.f. of
t-values (Left) and Density of KS test p-values (Right) (5000 trials).
left of the vertical lines at .05 and at .10 contain, respectively, p-values for which the
null is rejected at the 5% and 10% level.
The histogram in Figure: 3-2 shows that the p-values are concentrated around .6,
and hence are far from the rejection region. In 5000 repetitions of the KS test, the
joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is not once rejected at the
10% significance level. Hence the failure to reject the joint null hypothesis of equality
of winning probabilities is indeed robust to the realization of the 𝑡 values.
Figure: 3-3 shows the result of the KS test applied to the Hawk-Eye data for first
serves by men. As noted in Table: 3.3, this test is based on 226,298 first serves in
7198 point games. Figure: 3-3 shows a typical realization of the empirical c.d.f. of
𝑡 values and the theoretical c.d.f.. The empirical and theoretical c.d.f.s very nearly
coincide. The value of the KS test statistic is 𝐾 = .927 and the associated p-value is
.357. Despite its enormous power, the test does not come close to rejecting the null
hypothesis.
Figure 3-3 right panel shows that this conclusion is robust to the realizations of
the 𝑡 values. In only one instance (.04%) of 5000 trials of the KS test is the null
hypothesis rejected at the 5% level. In only .12% of the trials is it rejected at the
10% level. The mean p-value is .691, which is far from the rejection region.
Walker and Wooders (2001) studied only first serves since there were few (only
1260) second serves in their data. Figure: 3-4 shows the result of the KS test applied
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Figure 3-3: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Men’s First Serves). Empirical
c.d.f. of t-values (Left) and Density of KS test p-values (Right) (5000 trials).
to the Hawk-Eye data for second serves by men. For a typical realization of the 𝑡
values, such as the one shown in Figure: 3-4, the joint null hypothesis of equality of
winning probabilities is not rejected. Figure: 3-4 shows the density of p-values from
the KS tests after 5000 trials. Only for a small fraction of these trials (2.54%) is the
joint null rejected at the 5% level. The mean p-value is .492.
Figure 3-4: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Men’s Second Serves). Empirical
c.d.f. of t-values (Left) and Density of KS test p-values (Right) (5000 trials).
While the data for both first and second serves is strikingly consistent with the
theory, comparing Figures 3-3 and 3-4 reveals that the result is slightly less robust
for second serves. This is a consequence, in part, of the fact that there are fewer
second serves than first serves in each point game, and thus the intervals 𝑈 [𝐹 (𝑛𝑖𝐿𝑆 −
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1;𝑛𝑖𝑆, 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿, 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅), 𝐹 (𝑛
𝑖
𝐿𝑆;𝑛
𝑖
𝑆, 𝑛
𝑖
𝐿, 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅)] from which the 𝑡 values are drawn tend to be larger
for second serves.15
In the Hawk-Eye data for women, there are 110,886 first serves and 41,376 second,
obtained in 4,108 matches. For women, while the empirical and theoretical c.d.f.s of
𝑡-values appear to the eye to be close, the vertical distance is in fact sufficiently large
that the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is rejected for many
realizations of the 𝑡’s. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show, respectively, the results of KS tests
of the hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 for all 𝑖, for first and second serves, respectively. For
first serves, the null is rejected at the 5% and 10% significance level in 43.70% and
72.06% of 5000 trials, respectively.
The results for second serves are more ambiguous. While the p-values shown in
Figure 3-6 right panel tend to be small, the mean p-value is .259. The null hypothesis
tends not to be rejected at the 5% level. In only 16.74% of the trials is the p-value
below .05.
Figure 3-5: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Women’s First Serves). Empirical
c.d.f. of t-values (Left) and Density of KS test p-values (Right) (5000 trials).
In sum, male professional tennis players show a striking conformity to the the-
ory on both first and second serves. By contrast, female professional tennis players
conform far less closely to the theory, especially on first serves.
15In a point game with 𝑛𝐿 left serves, 𝑛𝑅 right serves, and 𝑛𝑆 successful serves, there are
min(𝑛𝑆 , 𝑛𝐿)− max(𝑛𝑆 − 𝑛𝑅, 0) + 1 distinct intervals from which 𝑡 values are drawn.
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Figure 3-6: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Women’s Second Serves).
Empirical c.d.f. of t-values (Left) and Density of KS test p-values (Right) (5000
trials).
3.5 Serial Independence
We test the hypothesis that the server’s choice of direction of serve is serial indepen-
dent. For each point game 𝑖, let 𝑠𝑖 = (𝑠𝑖1, . . . , 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐿+𝑛𝑖𝑅) be the sequence of first-serve
directions, in the order in which they occurred, where 𝑠𝑖𝑛 ∈ {𝐿,𝑅}. Let 𝑟𝑖 denote
the number of runs in 𝑠𝑖. (A run is a maximal string of identical symbols, either
all 𝐿’s or all 𝑅’s.) Under the null hypothesis of serial independence, the probabil-
ity that there are exactly 𝑟 runs in a randomly ordered list of 𝑛𝐿 occurrences of 𝐿
and 𝑛𝑅 occurrences of 𝑅 is known. Denote this probability by 𝑓𝑅(𝑟;𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) and let
𝐹𝑅(𝑟;𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) denote the associated c.d.f. At the 5% significance level, the null is
rejected if 𝐹𝑅(𝑟;𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) ≤ .025 or if 1 − 𝐹𝑅(𝑟 − 1;𝑛𝐿, 𝑛𝑅) ≤ .025, i.e., if the prob-
ability of 𝑟 or fewer runs is less than .025 or the probability of 𝑟 or more runs less
less than .025. In the former case, the null is rejected since there are too few runs,
i.e., the server switches the direction of serve too infrequently to be consistent with
randomness. In the later case, the null is rejected as the server switches direction too
frequently.
To test the joint null hypothesis that first serves are serial independent, we employ
the randomized test introduced in Walker and Wooders (2001). In particular, for each
point game 𝑖 we draw the random test statistic 𝑡𝑖 given by a draw from 𝑈 [𝐹𝑅(𝑟𝑖 −
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1;𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅), 𝐹𝑅(𝑟
𝑖;𝑛𝑖𝐿, 𝑛
𝑖
𝑅)]. Under the joint null hypothesis of serial independence, each
𝑡𝑖 is distributed 𝑈 [0, 1]. We then apply the KS test to the empirical distribution of
the 𝑡 values.
Figure: 3-7 shows representative empirical c.d.f.s of t-values for first serves (left
panel) and for second serves (right panel) for the Hawk-Eye data for men. The joint
null hypothesis of serial independence is decisively rejected, for both first and second
serves, with p-values virtually equal to zero. (We omit the empirical density of the
KS test p-values since the null is rejected for every realization of the 𝑡’s.) In each case,
the empirical c.d.f. lies below the theoretical c.d.f., and hence the null is rejected as
a consequence of too much switching. These results confirm the WW (2001) finding
of negative serial correlation in first serves by men.
Figure 3-7: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑠𝑖 is serial independent ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Men’s Serves)
Empirical c.d.f. of t-values for first serve (Left) and second serve (Right).
WW (2001) studied serial correlation for male players. Figure: 3-8 shows the
empirical c.d.f. of t-values for first and second serves by women for the Hawk-Eye
data. Women also exhibit negative serial correlation in the direction of serve, for both
first and second serves.
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Figure 3-8: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑠𝑖 is serial independent ∀𝑖 (Hawk-Eye, Women’s Serves)
Empirical c.d.f. of t-values for first serve (Left) and second serve (Right).
3.6 Discussion
In this section we use Monte Carlo simulations to study the properties of the KS test
of the joint hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities. We show that the test
is valid when the empirical c.d.f. is generated from the Pearson goodness of fit test
p-values, so long as the number of point games is not too large (as it was in WW
(2001)). If, however, the number of points games is large, as it is for our Hawk-Eye
data, then the same test rejects the null even when it is true. We show, in contrast,
that when the empirical c.d.f. is generated from the Fisher Exact test t-values, then
the test is valid regardless of the number of point games.
Prior tests of the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities have
used the Pearson joint test and the KS test based on the Pearson goodness of fit
p-values. In this section we show that the KS test based on the randomized Fisher t-
values is more powerful than both these tests. In Section 3.4.3 it was established that
this more-powerful test, when applied to the WW (2001) data, confirms their original
findings. (See Figure: 3-2.) Here we show that the more powerful test overturns
HHT’s (2007) finding that the serve and return play of female professional tennis
players and of players in junior matches is consistent with theory.
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3.6.1 Valid Tests for Small and Large Samples
We first show that the KS test based on p-values from the Pearson goodness of fit
test is valid for sample sizes of the kind studied in WW (2001). We simulate data
for 40 point games to generate an empirical c.d.f. of p-values. In the simulated data,
every point game has 70 serves, each serve is equally likely to be to the left or to the
right, and a serve in either direction wins with probability 2/3.16 In particular, the
null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is true for the simulated data.
Figure 3-9: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Monte Carlo, 40 point games. Empirical
c.d.f. of Pearson p-values (Right) and Density of KS test p-values (10,000 trials)
(Left).
Figure 3-9 shows a representative empirical c.d.f. of 40 p-values obtain from ap-
plying the Pearson goodness of fit test of equality of winning probabilities to the
simulated data. For the joint null hypothesis, the KS test statistic is 𝐾 = 0.626 and
the associated p-value is 0.829. Under the null hypothesis, and provided the assump-
tions of the statistical tests hold, the KS p-value is uniformly distributed. To verify
it is, we simulated the data 10,000 times, each time (i) generating an empirical c.d.f.
of 40 p-values, (ii) applying the KS test to determine whether the p-values are uni-
formly distributed, and (iii) recording the associated p-value of the KS test.17 Figure
3-9 shows that the empirical density of these p-values is indeed uniform. At the 5%
16WW (2001) data set had 40 point games, with an average of 75.65 serves per game. An average
of 54% of the serves were to the left.
17Importantly, a new simulated data set is created in each trial. For the densities shown in Figures
3-2 through 3-6, by contrast, the data is fixed and the trials differ only in the realized t-values.
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significance level, the (true) joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities
is rejected in 4.48% of the trials. Likewise, at the 10% significance level the joint null
is rejected in 8.89% of the trials.
Figure: 3-10 reports the results of repeating this process, but with 7000 point
games in order to match the size of the Hawk-Eye data set. Figure: 3-10 shows a
representative empirical c.d.f. of 7000 p-values. For each realization of the p-values,
we compute the associated p-value from the KS test. It is immediately evident from
Figure: 3-10 that the empirical density of the KS p-values is not close to uniform.
At the 5% significance level, for example, we see that the KS test rejects the joint
null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities in the majority of trials (53.63%),
even though the joint null is true!
Figure 3-10: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Monte Carlo, 7000 point games. Empirical
c.d.f. of Pearson p-values (Right) and Density of KS test p-values (10,000 trials)
(Left).
Under the null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities, the test statistic
for the Pearson goodness of fit test is asymptotically distributed chi-square one as the
number of serves grows large. Hence the p-values shown in Figure: 3-10 are also only
asymptotically uniformly distributed as well. Figure: 3-10 shows that when applying
the KS test to empirical c.d.f.s comprised of 7000 these p-values, we frequently reject
that they are uniformly distributed.
Figure 3-11 shows the results of simulating 7000 point games exactly as above,
except that the KS test is based on the empirical distribution of the randomized Fisher
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exact test t-values. As established earlier, the t-values are uniformly distributed under
the null even for finite samples. For each realization of the t-values, we compute the
associated p-value from the KS test. Figure: 3-11 shows that the KS test performs
as it should – the p-values from the KS test are distributed uniformly. The KS test
rejects the (true) joint null hypothesis at the 5% significance level in 4.55% of 10,000
trials; at the 10% level it rejects the joint null hypothesis in 9.39% of the trials.
Figure 3-11: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖 (Monte Carlo, 7000 point games. Empirical
c.d.f. t-values (Right) and Density of KS test p-values (10,000 trials) (Left).
While we omit it here, Monte Carlo simulations show that the KS test based on
the empirical distribution of t-values also performs as expected for small sample sizes.
For expositional convenience we have simulated data for homogeneous point games,
i.e., every point game has 70 serves, serves left and right are equally likely, and the
probability of winning a point is 2/3 for every serve. The results we report, however,
are robust to simulating data that matches the observed characteristics of the WW
(2001) data or the Hawk-Eye data.18
3.6.2 The Power of the Our Test
We have established that the KS test of the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning
probabilities is valid for large samples when the empirical c.d.f. is based on the
18In this case, for each point game in the tennis data, we simulate a point game with the same
number of serves in each direction. It is simulated under the assumption that the winning probabil-
ities for serves left and serve right are the same, with both equal to the empirical winning frequency
for the point game.
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randomized Fisher Exact test t-values, but not when it is based on the Pearson
goodness of fit p-values. Using t-values rather than p-values also yields a test that is
more powerful against the alternative hypothesis that the winning probabilities are
unequal for left and right serves, i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝐿 ̸= 𝑝𝑖𝑅, as we now establish via Monte Carlo
simulations.
To evaluate the power of our tests, we follow WW (2001) and frame our discussion
in terms of the following hypothetical point game.
Receiver
L R
Server L 0.58 0.79 0.53 1/3
R 0.73 0.49 0.46 1/3
2/3 1/3
In the game’s mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the receiver chooses L with probabil-
ity 2/3 and the server chooses L with probability 0.53 1/3. The probability the server
wins the point is 0.65 for serves L and for serves R. Denote by 𝜃 the probability that
the receiver chooses L. Our null hypothesis that 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 can equivalently be viewed
as the null hypothesis that 𝜃 = 2/3. Denote by 𝐻𝑎(𝜃) the alternative hypothesis that
the receiver chooses L with probability 𝜃. Then the server’s winning probabilities are
𝑝𝐿(𝜃) = .58𝜃 + .79(1− 𝜃)
and
𝑝𝑅(𝜃) = .73𝜃 + .49(1− 𝜃).
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to determine the probability that the joint
null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is rejected when the alternative
hypothesis 𝐻 𝑖𝑎(𝜃) in point game 𝑖 is true.
We first simulate data for 40 points games with payoffs as given above. In the
simulated data every point game has 70 serves, and serves in each direction are equally
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likely.19 Figure 3-12 shows the probability that the joint null hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 40} is rejected when 𝐻 𝑖𝑎(𝜃) ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 40} is true, as a function of
𝜃 for several different tests. The power function in red is for the KS test based on
the empirical distribution of the 40 p-values from the Pearson goodness of fit test.
The power function in green is for the Pearson joint test, and is the analogue of the
power function shown in Figure 4 of WW (2001). The power function in black is for
the KS test based on the empirical distribution of 40 𝑡-values from the randomized
Fisher exact test. The later test is, by far, the most powerful of the three. If 𝜃 = .6,
for example, the KS based on the 𝑡’s rejects the joint null hypothesis of the equality
of winning probabilities at the 5% significance level with probability .256, while the
Pearson joint test and the KS test based on the 𝑝’s reject the null with probability
.080 and .055, respectively.
Figure 3-12: Power Functions t-values (black), p-values (red), and Pearson joint
(green).
The right panel of Figure 3-12 shows the power function for the KS test based
on the randomized Fisher exact test t-values when data is simulated for 7000 point
games, i.e., for approximately the number of point games in our Hawk-Eye data. The
power functions for the Pearson joint test and the KS test based on the p-values from
the Pearson goodness of fit test are omitted since, as shown earlier, neither is a valid
test (both tests reject the null with high probability even when it is true). Table:
19We simulate the data with equal probability on serves in each direction to maintain conformity
with the prior results. Simulating it with the hypothetical point game’s .53 1/3 equilibrium mixture
probably on left for the server has a negligible impact on the result reported below.
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3.5 provides more detail, showing the power of the tests for 𝜃 near 2/3 at the 5%
significance level.
𝜃 KS based on 𝑡𝑖 KS based on 𝑝𝑖 Pearson joint test
0.65 0.995 0.554 0.275
0.66 0.454 0.548 0.241
2/3 0.042 0.515 0.197
0.67 0.169 0.564 0.229
0.68 0.960 0.551 0.244
Table 3.5: Rejection rate for 𝐻0 at the 5% level, 𝑁 = 7, 000.
A more powerful test and a far larger data set produce a test of the joint null
hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities that is far more powerful than any
reported in the prior literature.
3.6.3 Re-Analysis of Prior Findings
WW (2001) found that the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities
did not come close to being rejected. We established above that the same hypothesis
is not rejected for the WW data even when using the more powerful KS test based
on the randomized Fisher exact test t-values.
Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007) studies a dataset comprised of ten men’s matches,
nine women’s matches, and eight juniors’ matches. The men’s and women’s matches
are all from Grand Slam finals, while the juniors matches include the finals, quar-
terfinals, and second-round matches in both tournaments and Grand Slam matches.
HHT (2007) found, using the KS test based on p-values, that the joint null hypoth-
esis of equality of winning probabilities is not rejected for any one of their data sets,
or all three jointly. The KS statistics are 0.778 for men (p-value .580), 0.577 for
women (p-value .893), 0.646 for juniors (p-value .798), and 0.753 (p-value .622) for
all 27 matches or 108 point games combined. For women and juniors, however, this
conclusion is not robust to using the more powerful test based on the t-values.
The top panel of Figure 3-13 shows, for the HHT (2007) men’s data, a represen-
tative empirical c.d.f. of t-values (left panel) and the empirical distribution of the
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p-values (right panel) obtained from 5000 repetitions of the KS test. In 5000 repe-
titions, the joint null hypothesis is not rejected once, even at the 10% level. Hence
the more powerful test supports HHT’s findings for men. For women (middle panel)
and juniors (bottom panel), by contrast, the same joint null hypothesis is frequently
rejected. For women, for example, it is rejected in 18.48% of 5000 trials at the 5%
level and in 45.30% of all trials at the 10% level. The leftward shift of the empirical
density of the p-values is even more striking for juniors. For that data, the joint null
is rejected at the 5% level in 49.56% of the trials and at the 10% level in 77.48% of
the trials.
Thus the KS test based on the t-values has sufficiently more power that it changes
the conclusions of prior studies.
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Figure 3-13: KS test of 𝐻0 : 𝑝𝑖𝐿 = 𝑝𝑖𝑅 ∀𝑖, HHT men (top), women (middle), juniors
(bottom).
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Abstract
In most collective actions, individuals’ incentives are not perfectly aligned with the
goals of the group/team they are part of. We investigate how individual specific
incentives affect both individuals and team leaders’ strategies in a natural setting.
We use a discontinuity in individual rewards in batsmen scoring in cricket to identify
the causal effect of such incentives on behavior. We find that batsmen react to the
presence of individual-specific incentives by adopting strategies that may be subop-
timal at the team level. More surprisingly, we also find that team captains react to
these individual incentives by adopting suboptimal strategies at the team level, which
may bring large benefits to the individual players. These results suggest a complex
interplay of individual and team incentives which we conjecture may arise in repeated
team interactions.
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4.1 Introduction
From the early literature on the role of firm managers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) to
the industrial organisation on contracts and mechanism design (Laffont and Martimort
2009), economists have given a lot of attention to find solutions to the imperfect align-
ment between individuals’ incentives and an organisation’s collective goals (Prendergast
1999). In that literature a key role of managers is to monitor individuals to reward
behaviour aligned with the collective goals and reduce suboptimal behaviour, such as
shirking. However, another strand of literature, since Akerlof (1982), has put forward
a vision of reciprociprocal behaviour between an organisation’s leadership and its
members: gifts (high wages, recognition) from the organisation are reciprocated by
high effort from the members of the organisation. By rewarding individual members
(rather than strictly monitoring them), organisations may benefit from greater effort
and cohesion. Experimental research in organizational economics has provided mixed
results suggesting that agents do react to personal incentives but also that reciprocal
behaviour can play a substantial role (Camerer and Weber 2012).
This study contributes to the empirical literature investigating how the existence
of individual specific incentives affects individuals’ behaviour in organisations, and
how leadership deals with such incentives. We use cricket matches as the setting of a
naturally occurring quasi-experiment where variations in individual-specific incentives
and individual and team strategies are observable. Namely, we use an existing dis-
continuity in batsmen’s individual specific rewards around milestones (scoring 50, 100
or 200). This discontinuity allows us to cleanly identify a causal effect of individual-
specific incentives on players’ and team captains’ strategic behaviour.
We find that, in line with traditional industrial organisation literature, players
react to these incentives by adopting suboptimal strategies for the team. However,
we also find that team captains adjust their strategies to allow batsmen to reach these
individual rewards. We conjecture that captains’ behaviour may be the tell-tale sign
of an implicit norm whereby they are expected to care about each player’s individual
rewards. Such a norm can be efficient if it leads to a higher level of effort and team
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cohesion in line with Akerlof’s gift exchange mechanism. Such findings suggest that
the relation between individual-specific incentives and team incentives may be more
complex than the conflict assumed in most standard economic models.
4.2 The game of cricket
4.2.1 The game
Cricket is a sport played mostly in Commonwealth countries. It is one of the major
sports in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Caribbean islands
and the most popular sport in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is a
batting game where teams bat in innings. In each innings, the batting team can align
11 batsmen, who are fielded in pairs. Innings are divided in overs, which consists of
6 balls thrown by a given bowler. Each batsman protects a “wicket”, three wooden
stumps with two little wood pieces, “the bails”, on top of them. Batsmen are typically
dismissed when the bowler manages to hit the wicket with his ball or when a shot
from the batsman is caught clean in the air. When a batsman is dismissed, another
one comes “to the crease” to form a new pair. Teams aim to score more “runs” in
their batting innings than the opposite team.
The game exists in different length formats. In this paper we use historical data
from one-day international (ODI) matches and internatiaonal test matches. In “one-
day” cricket, a format first played at international level in 1971, teams bat one innings
each in a match that lasts one day. In each innings, there are 50 overs (300 balls).
The team with the highest score wins. A draw can only happen when both teams
score exactly the same number of runs, which rarely happens. In “test” cricket, the
oldest form of the game, each team bat in turn over two innings in a match that lasts
up to five full days. To win, a team needs to score more “runs” when batting and to
dismiss all the batsmen of the opposition in their two innings. If a team scores more
than the opposition but does not dismiss all the other team’s batsmen twice within
five days, the match ends in a draw. There are no limits to the number of overs per
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innings; a team continues to bat until all their batsmen are dismissed or until its
captain declares the innings closed when he is satisfied that the achieved score is high
enough.
4.2.2 Batsmen’s incentives and strategies
In a match, batsmen should aim to bat in a way which maximises the team’s expected
number of runs. Batsmen face a risk-return trade off in their batting strategy. High
scoring rates come with higher risks of dismissal. Thus, batsmen have to optimise
their risk-taking by choosing the right “strike rate” (average number of runs per ball)
to aim for. The optimal strike rate from a team point of view will typically depend
on the match’s score, the batsman’s ability and the number of batsmen left in the
team. Clarke (1988), Clarke and Norman (1999), and Preston and Thomas (2000) use
dynamic programming to compute the optimal strike rate of a batsman as a function
of the match’s score and the batsman’s ability. In one day matches, the limited
number of balls creates an opportunity cost of scoring at a low rate. Therefore, a
team benefits from a batsman adopting a strike rate that is higher and riskier than
the one which would maximise his individual total score (Barr and Kantor 2004). By
adopting such a risky strategy, a batsman is more likely to score a lower overall score
but, if all batsmen do the same over the limited number of balls, this is likely to lead
to a higher total for the whole team.
In addition, batsmen also face individual specific incentives: scoring many runs
increases their reputation and chances to be selected to play in future matches. Bats-
men’s achievement in their career is assessed by two types of statistics: first the
average number of runs they have scored in a match; second their ability to reach
very high scores. Reaching “half a century” (50), a “century” (100) or a “double cen-
tury” (200) in an innings is a symbolic achievement for a batsman. Batsmen’s career
performance are often summarised by how often they reached these milestones. Table
4.1 shows that batsmen reach such high scores only rarely.
While reaching landmarks brings clear rewards to the player, they do not affect
the team’s chances of winning the match. Specifically, the team’s marginal benefit of
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50 100 200
Test matches (unlimited overs per innings) 12.12 4.56 0.45
One day internationals (50 overs per innings) 11.87 2.17 0.01
Table 4.1: Percentage of times that a player-innings observation corresponds to a
milestone. For instance, in the column 50 the percentage that a player-innings obser-
vation is between 50 and 99.
a run scored is very similar when a batsman increases his score from 98 to 99 than
when he passes from 99 to 100. For these reasons, the discontinuity in individual in-
centives around these landmarks gives us an opportunity to cleanly identify the effect
of individual-specific incentives on the players’ strategic behaviour. If the behaviour
of the players is only driven by the team’s success, we should not observe any change
in the strategic behaviour of the players when they pass symbolic landmarks. On
the contrary, we conjecture that batsmen decrease risk taking before a landmark in
order to decrease their chance of dismissal and raise their chances of reaching this
landmark.
4.2.3 Team captains’ strategies
To investigate how captains react to the existence of these individual incentives, we
can use a unique feature of test matches. In order to win in this format of the game,
a team need to both score more than the other team and dismiss all the opposition
batsmen in each of their two innings. If a team with a higher number of runs fails to
dismiss all the opposition’s batsmen at the end of the 5th day, the match ends in a
draw which is fairly frequent in test matches (34.9% vs <0.1% for ODI, in our data).
The captain of a leading team has therefore an interest to consider stopping to bat
and “declare” his team’s innings closed. When doing so he needs to balance the risks
of waiting too long to declare (likely draw) versus declaring too early (giving a chance
to the opposite team to win the match). The decision to declare and when to do so is
a key strategic decision: “a decision regarding the timing of a declaration is arguably
the most critical decision in the game, in terms of the effect the decision can have on
match outcome” (Scarf and Akhtar 2011).
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For the declaring decision to optimise the team’s winning chances, it should be
entirely determined by the team’s overall score, not by its individual batsmen’s score.
However, we conjecture that the captain may be mindful of the individual specific
rewards the batsmen are facing. If a captain is thinking about possibly declaring,
he may well decide to wait a bit more if one of the batsmen is close to a landmark
(50, 100 or 200). For instance, if a batsman has a score of 90, a declaration by the
captain will remove the chance for this batsman to score a century. In that case we
conjecture that the captain may wait until the player reaches the 100 landmark (or is
dismissed) to declare. While this may come at a cost in terms of the team’s winning
chances, it brings substantial individual rewards to the batsman.
4.3 Data and results
4.3.1 Study of the players’ strategies
We collected data on the number of runs scored by each batsman over 3,543 one
day international matches during the period 1971-2014 (61,836 observations). We
use this data to estimate whether a break exists in the density of dismissals around
landmarks (McCrary 2008). Figure 4-1 shows the density of batsmen’s dismissal
near the landmarks 50 and 100 (the subsample is too small for 200s landmarks).
The number of runs scored is the number of runs reached when the batsman was
dismissed. This figure shows a clear break at each landmark (𝑝 < 0.001 for 50s,
𝑝 < 0.001 for 100s). Indeed batsmen are less likely to be dismissed just before
reaching the landmarks than just after.
To study whether this discontinuity in the probability to observe a dismissal
around a landmark is due to variations in batsmen’s strategic level of risk taking,
we collected information about the ball-by-ball play for 1,256 matches over the pe-
riod 2001-2014. We then computed the number of runs scored by batsmen for each
ball they faced. Our data set contains information for 21,514 players batting in an
innings and 674,586 balls played. The left panel of Figure 4-2 shows the evolution
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Figure 4-1: McCrary test for the landmark 50 (left) and 100 (right) for ODI matches
over the period 1971-2014. Bandwidth of 5 runs, bindwidth of 1 run.
of batsmen’s strike rate around 50 (for batsmen who reached at least 70 in the in-
nings). The right panel of Figure 4-2 shows the evolution of the strike rate around
100 (for batsmen who reached at least 120 in the innings). We observe a significant
discontinuity with batsmen adopting a lower strike rate (less risky) before reaching
the landmark (𝑝 < 0.001 for 50s, 𝑝 = 0.003 for 100s).
Figure 4-2: Discontinuity in the strike rate (average number of runs per ball) per
over around landmarks 50 (left) and 100 (right) for ODI matches over the period
2001-2014. Local linear regression, triangle kernel, bandwidth of 5 runs. The left
panel restricts the sample to players who reached 70 in the innings and the right
panel restricts the sample to players who reached 120 in the innings.
Such an adjustment of the batsmen’s strategy has a cost for the team in terms of
the chances to win the match. Any decrease in risk taking will come with a decrease
in the expected final score and therefore in the team’s chances. By decreasing their
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risk taking, batsmen are trading a smaller chance for the team to win the match for
a higher chance for them to reach this personal milestone.
4.3.2 Study of the captains’ strategies
To study how team captains’ strategies are affected by batsmen’s individual incen-
tives, we collected data on declaration times in 2,089 test matches over the period
1880-2014. We look at the density of batsmen’s scores near each landmark, in matches
where a declaration was made around each landmark, using the same test of break in
density (McCrary 2008). Figure 4-3 shows the results of the test. This figure shows
a clear break at each landmark. Indeed, when a declaration is made, batsmen are
much more likely to have reached a landmark than to be just below one. This implies
that, when a batsman is close to achieving a landmark, captains are delaying their
declaration decision to allow the batsman to reach their landmark score.
Figure 4-3: McCrary test for the landmarks 50 (left), 100 (centre) and 200 (right)
when a declaration took place for test matches over the period 1880-2014. For the
landmarks 50 and 100 we use a bandwidth of 5 runs and a bindwidth of 1 run. Given
the small number of observations for the landmark 200, we used a bandwidth of 10
runs. .
This delay may increase the risk of a draw and decrease the chance of a win.
Our data does not allow us to test for the magnitude of this cost. It is possible for
the cost to the team to be relatively small if the batsman is close enough to the
landmark. However, simulations by Scarf and Akhtar (2011) suggest the possibility
of a substantial cost. If a captain waits for one of his batsman to score around 10-20
runs to reach a landmark, he will in practice be waiting for the team to score around
20-40 runs (as a batsman scores on average half the runs of the batting pair). Scarf
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and Akhtar (2011) give the example of a team having reached a lead of 400 in the
third inning and considering whether to declare with 1.3 days left to play. Their
model suggests that waiting the time required to score another 40 runs will actually
decrease the winning chances of the team by 20 percentage points. While we cannot
be sure about the exact cost for the team, our evidence suggests that team captains
are willing to trade such a cost to the team in favour of a substantial reward to a
particular player.
4.4 Discussion
We find clear evidence that batsmen and team captains’ behaviour in cricket are af-
fected by batsmen’s individual-specific incentives in the game. First, batsmen adopt
suboptimal strategies in order to increase their chances of reaching symbolic land-
marks at the cost of the team’s winning chances. Second, team captains seem mindful
of such incentives and delay the decision to declare an innings closed when a batsman
is near a symbolic landmark, here again at the cost of their teams’ winning chances.
This study contributes to our understanding of the effect of individual-specific
incentives on individual and leadership’s strategies in organisations. In line with
standard economic theory predictions, we find that players react to individual-specific
incentives in ways which can be detrimental to the team as a whole. However, the
most important contribution of this study is to show that team captains also react
to individual-specific incentives by accommodating them. Doing so, the team captain
does not seem at first sight to implement an optimal strategy from the team point of
view. We conjecture that it is an example of what Akerlof (1982) called a gift exchange
norm between an organisation leadership and its members whereby gifts from the
leadership are reciprocated by high effort from the members of the organisation.
Here, the captain may allow players to reach strictly personal gains whenever the
cost to the whole team is not too large. This norm may lead to a higher level of
overall performance if players reciprocate with high effort.
Importantly, captains’ decisions are public and observable by all players. In or-
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ganisations, leaders may grant rewards to specific individuals in order to secure a
backing coalition. In the case of a cricket match, such considerations may not be
absent (the tenure of a captain depends on the support of the players). However,
the fact that all players can observe the captain’s decision requires for the team not
to fundamentally disapprove his decision making. This suggests that captains’ deci-
sions reflect a reciprocity norm tacitly accepted within the team: that if a batsman
is within range of scoring a landmark, he should be offered this chance–provided the
cost to the team’s winning chances is not too high. If teammates foresee that such a
convention will improve the contribution of the player later on and contribute to fos-
tering a cohesive spirit through mutual reciprocity, it is rational for them to support
the captain’s decision. Our results therefore suggest that a complex interplay may
exist between individual and team incentives instead of the necessary conflict often
assumed in economic models.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and contribution
In this thesis I presented three essays which take advantage of natural experiments
arising in professional sports to investigate players’ strategic behaviour in tourna-
ments. In all chapters, I applied cutting edges econometric methods on novel datasets.
The experimental literature found discrepancies between contest theory’s predic-
tions and actual players’ behaviour. This divergences have been explained by bounded
rationality, non-monetary utility of winning, wrong beliefs, and lack of experience
(Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015). I provided evidences that the be-
haviour of top agents in the field with high stakes closely match theory’s predictions.
In Chapter 2, I developed a game theoretic model predicting a “momentum effect”
in dynamic contest. To test its predictions empirically, I took advantage of a quasi-
experiment occurring in tennis game play. In accordance with my model predictions
I found evidence of a “winner effect” for male players. However, I did not observe
such an effect for female players.
In contradiction with laboratory findings, in Chapter 3, I show that the serve and
return behaviour of male professional tennis players conforms remarkably closely to
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Yet female players’ behaviour slightly deviates
from it.
And finally in Chapter 4, I offer further supports to theory’s predictions by looking
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into how agents react to incentives in collectives organization. I find that, in line
with the traditional industrial literature, agents react to their individual incentives
by adopting suboptimal strategies for the group they are part of.
5.2 Shortcomings
While my results offer striking support to contest theory’s predictions, they should
not be taken at face value. Laboratory experiments study inexperienced subjects per-
forming low stakes tasks. In contrast, in my thesis I looked at experts performing high
stakes tasks. In most real world contests, the agents’ level of talent and experience is
situated in-between experimental subjects and professional sport players.
To investigates the extend to which experts’ skills and experience transfer to un-
familiar environments, several laboratory experiments used professionals as subjects
(Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and Gu 1999, List 2003, Alevy, Haigh, and List 2007, Palacios-
Huerta and Volij 2008, Garratt, Walker, and Wooders 2012, Van Essen and Wooders
2015). While experts’ strategic behavior conforms less closely to standard economic
predictions in the laboratory than in the field, they tend to do better than inexperi-
enced subjects.
In particular, the ability of professionals to play mixed strategies outside of their
field of expertise has attracted considerable attention. Following Walker and Wood-
ers (2001), in Chapter 3, I have shown that professional tennis serve and return
behaviour is consistent with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In an effort to bet-
ter understand the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour of professionals in
the field and student subjects in the laboratory, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008)
showed that professional soccer players play mixed strategies in a laboratory setting.
Thus demonstrating that skills and experience are transferable from the well-known
field to the abstract setting of the laboratory. However, in a following study Levitt,
List, and Reiley (2010) failed to replicate such results. Furthermore, Wooders (2010)
re-examining Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) data casted doubt on his findings by
showing that "‘the actual play of professionals is too close to the theoretically ex-
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pected play"’. In a following study Van Essen and Wooders (2015) conducted a
mixed strategy game experiment with a group of professional poker players and a
group of students. They show that while professional poker players play deviates
from the equilibrium they are playing closer to it than student subjects.
Thus, there is some evidence that skills and experience is, to some degree, trans-
ferable from the field to other environments, but much more remains to be done to
truly understand the external validity of my results.
5.3 Directions for future research
Besides the investigation of the ecological validity of my results, my findings open new
avenues for research. Firstly, the gender differences observed in Chapter 3 and Chap-
ter 4 require further investigation. And secondly, in each chapter several additional
aspects could be examined.
5.3.1 Gender difference
In Chapter 2 and 3 I found that in contrast to men’s, women’s strategic behaviour
deviates from the optimal one. The gender difference in the ability to play mixed
strategy (Chapter 3) can be explained by the particular setting under scrutiny. To
be specific, we looked at serve and return behaviour of professional tennis players.
In tennis the serves are more important for men than women. Hence, the observed
gender difference might be due to differences in gameplay. Female players may have
less incentive to learn how to play at the equilibrium. Alternatively, the selection
process to become a top tennis player might emphasis more on the ability to play
mixed strategy while serving for men than for women.
However, the gender difference found in Chapter 2, whereby the absence of momen-
tum effect for female players in dynamic contest, cannot be explained by differences
in gameplay. Previous literature has found gender differences in preferences for com-
petitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). My results shed new lights on gender
differences in the reaction to incentive within tournaments and open new avenues for
101
research. It is essential that we better understand the mechanisms behind this gen-
der differences. Furthermore, most of the literature looking at gender differences for
competitiveness used laboratory experiments. We thus need to determine the extent
to which this gender differences hold outside the specific environment under scrutiny.
5.3.2 Chapters extensions
Apart from the external validity of my results and the gender differences, in each
chapter several additional questions could be investigated.
In Chapter 2, I built a theoretical model which looks at the players’ optimal
effort expenditure depending on their incentives. I assumed that the more effort one
expends the more likely one is to win a point. For male players, the observed winning
patterns is consistent with my model predictions. However, I do not directly observe
the players’ effort, I only observe the points’ outcome. It would be interesting to
measure players’ effort and study how it is influence by players’ incentives. While
the Hawk eyed system do not record the position of the players, one could infer the
position of the players from the position of the ball. Thus, it might be possible to
estimate how much one run in a point, and therefore measures one’s effort. Such
analysis would be complex and messy, but it has the potential to bring precious
insights. Indeed, efforts is at the cornerstone of contest theory, but so far nobody has
been able to convincingly measure it in the field.
In Chapter 3, I have shown that while male players serving behaviour is consistent
with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, female players slightly deviate from it. It
would be interesting to estimate the payoff cost of deviating from optimal play. The
equilibrium play implies that a player should have the same winning probabilities
when serving right than when serving left. For instance, if in a pointgame we observe
60% serve right and 40% serve left and the player wins 65% of his serve on the right
and 70% on the left, one could win more point by switching a few serves from the
right to the left. The main challenge in finding the cost of "deviating" is that we do
not know how many serves would have to be switched to reach the same proportion of
point won on each side. If we were to find a credible way to do so we could estimate
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the overall cost of deviation by simulations (simulating matches with equilibrium
proportion vs observed ones).
In Chapter 4, I observe that batsman change their strategic behaviour when ap-
proaching a symbolic milestone. Various aspects could affect this behaviour. For
instance, is the effect the same for an experienced batsman which has already reached
this landmark a few time in his career less than for a novice which has never reached
such milestone? Is there a cultural difference in the reaction to individual incentives?
Are the Asian teams (e.g India, Bangladesh, Pakistan) less affected than the western
ones (e.g England, Australia, New Zealand)?
Another interesting question would be whether the gift from the leadership is
reciprocated by the players after reaching their individual milestone. In other words,
if a captain wait for a player to reach a milestone to declare, is the player behaving
more altruistic in the next game?
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Appendix A
Supplement to Essay 1: “Does success
breed success? A quasi-experiment on
strategic momentum in dynamic
contests.”
In Section: A.1 we show the effect of winning a point on the next for different donuts
and scorelines. In Section: A.2 we show our robustness checks for female players and
different donuts. And in Section: A.3 we explain how the distance of a bounce to the
court’s line is computed.
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A.1 Results
A.1.1 Overall effect on the next point
Figure A-1: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the next for a
donut of 0 cm with the 5% level confidence interval.
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Figure A-2: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the next for a
donut of 0.5 cm with the 5% level confidence interval.
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A.2 Robustness checks
Effect on the previous point
Figure A-3: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the previous point
for a donut of 0 cm with the 5% level confidence interval.
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Figure A-4: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the previous point
for a donut of 0.5 cm with the 5% level confidence interval.
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Figure A-5: Effect of winning a point on the probability of winning the previous point
for a donut of 1 cm with the 5% level confidence interval.
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A.2.1 Ex ante probability of winning the match and ranking
Figure A-6: Ex ante probability of winning the match (right) and measure of ranking
(left) depending on the distance from which the player hits the court’s line for female
players with the 5% level confidence interval.
McCrary test
Figure A-7: McCrary test of a break in the density of the ball bounces around the
threshold for a bandwidth of 4 cm for female players.
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A.3 Distance computation
Figure A-8 shows how the distance of the bounce to the court’s line is computed.
Each ball bounce is constituted of 51 (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) coordinates, for each of this 51 points 𝑖
we compute 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒. The distance of the point to the baseline where
𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 is the coordinate of the baseline on the x-axis, and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 the
distance to the sideline where 𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 is the coordinate of the sideline on the y-axis.
We then have 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥 = max
𝑥1,...,𝑥51
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦 = max
𝑦1,...,𝑦51
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 the distance of the
bounce to the baseline and to the sideline. If at least one of this distance is positive
then the distance of the bounce to the court line is 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦), but if
both 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦 are below zero then 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 = − min
1,...,51
√︁
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖
2.
Figure A-8: Computation of the distance to the court line for four examplary bounces.
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